5. Loans from Attic Temples to the State

This paper investigates loans from local Attic temples to the Athenian state during the opening phase of the Peloponnesian war. Specifically, two documents are analyzed: IG I³ 369, which calculates the loans the state received from temples (432/1-423/2); and IG I³ 383, the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods (428/7). The evidence for these loans, although fragmentary, reveals a broad range of monetary support for the state. Over one-third of temples do not lend to Athens while many other temples lend once or on multiple occasions. Athenian documentation of these loans is epigraphically presented to the public through a framework of cooperation and solidarity with the state. They are recorded without organizational criteria of temple size, temple location in Attica, or loan amount so that all forms of financial support, no matter how small, receive equal recognition. The state, however, decreased its reliance upon the Other Gods during this time. Loans now complemented major funding from the Treasury of Athena and from allied phoros. A case study of the temple of Artemis Agrotera, which had one of the strongest financial relationships with the state, serves as an illustration of the temple-state financial nexus. It is argued that Artemis Agrotera’s major source of revenue was dedicated war spoils; the temple converted these spoils into a novel source of financing by lending them at interest to the state. Artemis Agrotera’s annual festival reinforced Athenian political and military dominance through commemoration of its victory at Marathon, and her classical temple was built (ca. 440) at the height of Athenian power in the Delian league. The evidence suggests that Artemis attracted worship and dedication from Athenian hoplites who offered spoils (i.e., sale proceeds from prisoners) to celebrate Athenian military strength. These spoils then became funding for future Athenian operations.

This paper addresses one aspect of the local effects of the Athenian arkhē: temples in Athens and Attica extending loans to the state. This is a different approach to investigating the local effects of the arkhē in allied poleis, but one that is equally valid. The domestic impact of empire in Athens is an important avenue of investigation because Attic religious institutions and the communities that used them were directly affected by the growth of Athenian political power. Financial lending behavior from these temples to the state is one measure of determining this level of impact. This phenomenon of local temple lending has received brief inclusion within larger studies of Athenian state financing. The primary source documenting these temple loans, the accounts of the Logistai (IG I³ 369), has been extensively analyzed for the information it provides on the civic and religious calendar, Athenian war spending, and for the religious landscape of Athens and Attica in the fifth century. [1] The financial contribution these temples made to Athenian wartime operations has been overshadowed when compared to the massive sums deposited on the acropolis as phoros and extended as loans from Athena Polias.

The first part of this paper will investigate loans from these local Athenian temples and their connection to Athenian wartime financing through the following questions: First, what is the evidence for loans to the state from these local institutions? Second, how did the state conceptualize these loans within the context of its wartime expenditures? Third, how did these local temples view their own relationship to the state through these loans?

The second part of this paper will focus on the temple of Artemis Agrotera as a case study of the local effects of the Athenian arkhē. Specifically, this temple’s history, major festival to Artemis, and financial transactions with the state will be investigated through the context of the arkhē. This paper posits the speculative argument that war spoils resulting from Athenian military operations were the major source of revenue for the temple of Artemis Agrotera. Furthermore, Artemis received added economic benefit by lending these products of warfare to the state at interest, which Athens then put to use as war financing. Artemis Agrotera supported the state’s current military campaigns through the spoils of previous campaigns, most likely in expectation of future financial windfall.

During the first eleven years of the Peloponnesian war, leading up to the peace of Nikias (433/2–423/2), Athens funded its wartime operations primarily through expenditure of Delian League funds and through a series of loans preserved on inscriptions from the Temple of Athena Polias and a number of local, Attic temples. [2] Athens received the majority of this money in the form of tribute (phoros) from her allies. The Athenians dedicated an aparkhē (1/60 amount) of this phoros to Athena and deposited the remainder of the funds in the Treasury of the Hellenotamiai. Treasury officials then directed monies from this war chest to wherever it was required. Money, precious dedicatory offerings, and cult paraphernalia from various local temples in Attica were transferred to the acropolis and made available to the state to use. These valuables were under the care of the Treasurers of the Other Gods, a board of officials created in Kallias Decree A (433/2). [3] Athens then borrowed this money from these local temples at interest to help finance its war operations.

The accounts of the Logistai (IG I³ 369) are the principal source of information on Athenian lending activity during the Archidamian phase of the Peloponnesian War. They present an inscribed narrative of loan activity to the Athenian state [4] from the temple of Athena Polias and from the Other Gods during the Panathenaiac cycle of 426/5–423/2 and conclude with a summary of loans the state received throughout the period of 433/2–423/2. [5] These loans are arranged by originating institution (Athena or Treasury of the Other Gods), by year, and are further organized by prytany. These transactions are presented in standard format: the loan is numbered, the tribe in prytany is recorded along with the date of the transaction, and the loan’s principal amount and the interest to be received are listed. The following loan from 426 (IG I³ 369.12–14) is a standard example:

The interest rate is not recorded. Meritt, however, has calculated this rate as 1 drachma of interest earned per day for every 5 talents loaned. [6] Loan and interest totals are provided at the close of each year.

Two loans from the Treasurers of the Other Gods appear in the final year of the Panathenaic cycle (423/2) and appear in the accounts of the Logistai. [7] Each loan from the Other Gods is recorded in a slightly different fashion than a loan from Athena. Instead of a loan simply being designated as originating from the Treasury of the Other Gods, the individual temples within this treasury that contributed a loan are each listed alongside the amount they extended and interest they were to receive. At the conclusion of this list, the sum of the individual loan amounts and the interest amounts are tabulated for each corporate loan. [8] Following these calculations, the accounts of the Logistai summarize the sum total of loans extended to the state from religious institutions during the first eleven years of the Peloponnesian War. It presents, first, the total amount in loans extended during the most recent Panathenaic cycle (426/5–423/2). Following this, these accounts present loan totals from Athena, several other divinities on the acropolis not associated with the Other Gods (i.e. Athena Nike and Hermes), and from the Other Gods extended during the seven-year period previous to this Panathenaic cycle (433/2–427/6). This document concludes with totals of loans from these sacred institutions to the state for the time period of 433/2–423/2.

The first loan from the Treasury of the Other Gods to appear in the accounts of the Logistai occurred on the twenty-fifth day of the first prytany (423/2) when the tribe Akamantis held prytany. The logistai record a minimum of sixteen temples that extended a total corporate loan of 30 talents, 5,990 drachmas and would receive a minimum of 2,120 drachmas interest from the state (Table 1). The damaged inscription, unfortunately, only preserves individual loan amounts that total about one-third of the amount of this corporate loan (Table 2). The individual loans that do survive have a large financial range: the temple of Herakles at Kynosarges extends the smallest loan of 20 drachmas while the temple of Poseidon at Sounion extends the largest at almost 5 ½ talents (Table 3). [9]

Table 1. First Loan from the Treasury of the Other Gods 423/2.

Divinity	Principal	Interest
Artemis Agrotera	–	360 drachmas (+)
Poseidon at Sounion	5 talents 2,000 drachmas (+)	370 drachmas (+)
Artemis at Mounikhia	1 talent 4,551 drachmas 1 ½ obols	–
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	–	3 drachmas 5 ½ obols (+)
Muses	500 drachmas (+)	6 drachmas 2 obols
Apollo Zoster	–	–
Adrasteia	86 drachmas	1 drachma
Bendis	86 drachmas	1 drachma
Apollo	–	8 drachmas
Herakles at Kynosarges	20 drachmas	1 ½ obols
Demophōn	–	–
Athena at Pallenis	1 talent 5,200 drachmas (+)	129 drachmas 3 ¾ obols
Apollo	–	–
Artemis Brauronia	1,396 drachmas 4 obols	16 drachmas (+)
Athena at Derioneon Palladion	850 drachmas (+)	11 drachmas (+)
Poseidon Kalaureatis	–	–
TOTALS	30 talents 5,990 drachmas	2,120 drachmas (+)
(+) = more than

Table 2. Preserved and Missing Totals from First Loan from the Other Gods.

Category	Amount
Total Amount Loan #1	30 talents 5,990 drachmas
Amount Preserved for Loan #1	9 talents 2,689 drachmas 5 ½ obols
Difference	21 talents 3,300 drachmas ½ obol

Table 3. First Loan from the Other Gods: Order of Magnitude.

Divinity	Principal	Interest
Herakles at Kynosarges	20 drachmas	1 ½ obols
Adrasteia	86 drachmas	1 drachma
Bendis	86 drachmas	1 drachma
Muses	500 drachmas (+)	6 drachmas 2 obols
Athena at Derioneon Palladion	850 drachmas (+)	11 drachmas (+)
Artemis Brauronia	1,396 drachmas 4 obols	16 drachmas (+)
Artemis Mounikhia	1 talent 4,551 drachmas 1 ½ obols	–
Athena at Pallenis	1 talent 5,200 drachmas (+)	129 drachmas 3 ¾ obols
Poseidon at Sounion	5 talents 2,000 drachmas (+)	370 drachmas (+)
(+) = more than

The Treasury of the Other Gods extended its second corporate loan on the twentieth day of the tenth prytany (423/2), near the close of the civic year when the tribe of Leontis held prytany. This loan principal totals 23 talents, 5,998 drachmas, and the interest, 82 drachmas (Table 4). Fortunately, there is more financial information preserved concerning the constituent temples that extended loans for this transaction than the previous one (Table 5). Sixteen individual loans are attached to specific deities. Similar to the individual temple contributions for the first corporate loan, this second corporate loan comprises a large range of individual temple loan principals (Table 6). The temple of Athena at the Palladion extends the smallest loan of 2 drachmas, 1 ½ obols. A quarter of the temples extend loans greater than 1 talent with Artemis Agrotera standing in as the largest lender at 4 talents, 1,950 drachmas.

Table 4. Second Loan from the Treasury of the Other Gods 423/2.

Divinity	Principal	Interest
Artemis Agrotera	4 talents 1,950 drachmas	14 drachmas 4 ½ obols
Aphrodite in the Gardens	2 talents 5,175 drachmas 1 obol	9 drachmas 4 ½ obols
?	2,840 drachmas (+)	1 drachma 3 ¾ obols
Dionysos	356 drachmas 1 obol	1 ½ obols
?	–	–
Poseidon at Sounion	4 talents 1,527 drachmas 4 ½ obols	14 drachmas 2 ¾ obols
?	4,749 drachmas 4 obols	2 drachmas 4 ½ obols
Artemis Mounikhia	–	–
Theseus	808 drachmas 4 ½ obols	2 ¾ obols
Hilisos (Ilissos)	402 drachmas 1 obol	1 ½ obols
Hephaistos	1 talent 1,748 drachmas	4 drachmas 2 ½ obols
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	1 drachma 2 obols (+)	–
Muses	521 drachmas	1 ¾ obols
God of Strangers	–	–
Herakles at Kynosarges	80 drachmas	½ obol
Demophōn	–	–
Apollo	–	–
Artemis Brauronia	353 drachmas 2 ½ obols	1 ½ obols
Athena Palladion	2 drachmas 1 ½ obols	–
?	144 drachmas 3 obols	½ obol
Mother at Agrai	200 drachmas (+)	–
Athena Zosteria	100 drachmas (+)	–
TOTALS	23 talents 5,998 drachmas	82 drachmas
(-) less than; (+) more than

Table 5. Preserved and Missing Totals from Second Loan from the Other Gods.

Category	Amount
Amount Preserved in Loan	15 talents 378 drachmas 2 obols
Difference	8 talents 5,621 drachmas 4 obols
Total	23 talents 5,998 drachmas

Table 6. Second Loan from the Other Gods: Order of Magnitude.

Divinity	Principal	Interest
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	1 drachma 2 obols (+)	–
Athena Palladion	2 drachmas 1 ½ obols	–
Herakles at Kynosarges	80 drachmas	½ obol
Athena Zosteria	100 drachmas (+)	–
?	144 drachmas 3 obols	½ obol
Mother at Agrai	200 drachmas (+)	–
Artemis Brauronia	353 drachmas 2 ½ obols	1 ½ obols
Dionysos	356 drachmas 1 obol	1 ½ obols
Hilisos (Ilissos)	402 drachmas 1 obol	1 ½ obols
Muses	521 drachmas	1 ¾ obols
Theseus	808 drachmas 4 ½ obols	2 ¾ obols
?	2,840 drachmas (+)	1 drachma 3 ¾ obols
Athena at Pallenis	3,418 drachmas 1 obol	1 drachma 5 ½ obols
?	4,749 drachmas 4 obols	2 drachmas 4 ½ obols
Hephaistos	1 talent 1,748 drachmas	4 drachmas 2 ½ obols
Aphrodite in the Gardens	2 talents 5,175 drachmas 1 obol	9 drachmas 4 ½ obols
Poseidon at Sounion	4 talents 1,527 drachmas 4 ½ obols	14 drachmas 2 ¾ obols
Artemis Agrotera	4 talents 1,950 drachmas	14 drachmas 4 ½ obols

These two corporate loans from the Treasury of the Other Gods constitute individual loans from a diverse collection of sacred institutions located from the urban center of Athens to the boundaries of Attica. This section will analyze these two loans to determine what, if any, organizational criteria were applied in inscribing them onto the accounts of the Logistai. Any patterns relating to the order in which these institutions were inscribed can perhaps illuminate how the Treasurers of the Other Gods managed these local temples within the treasury and how they served as a bridge between these treasuries and the state. First, when we compare the list of temples that extended funds to the state in the first and second corporate loans, they do not create a uniform list (Table 7). [10] Significant overlap does appear in these corporate loans: eleven temples served as lenders in both transactions. [11] Nineteen temples, however, are preserved as lenders for the second corporate loan against only sixteen for the first corporate loan. [12] The individual temples that appear in these corporate loans also differ: six temples appear in the first corporate loan but not in the second, [13] while another eight appear in the second loan but not the first. [14] For both loans, the list of participating temples in Tables 1 and 4 reveals that not every temple that held assets in the Treasury of the Other Gods extended funds to the state.

Table 7. Comparison of Temple Lenders: First and Second Loan from the Treasury of the Other Gods.

Temple	First Loan	Second Loan
Artemis Agrotera	X	X
Poseidon at Sounion	X	X
Athena Pallenis	X	X
Demophōn	X	X
Herakles at Kynosarges	X	X
Artemis Mounikhia	X	X
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	X	X
Muses	X	X
Apollo	X	X
Artemis Brauronia	X	X
Athena at the Derioneon Palladion	X	X
Adrasteia and Bendis	X (but separate)	–
Apollo Zoster	X	–
Adrasteia	X	–
Second Apollo?	X	–
Poseidon Kalaureatis	X	–
Athena Zosteria	–	X
Hephaistos	–	X
Theseus	–	X
Dionysos	–	X
Mother at Agrai	–	X
Hilisos (Ilissos)	–	X
Aphrodite in the Gardens	–	X
God of Strangers	–	X

Second, the temples are not recorded in a consistent, discernible order from the first to the second corporate loan (Table 8). Both lists begin with the temple of Artemis Agrotera; from there, they diverge sharply. [15] There are no preserved instances where the order of these temples is replicated between the first and the second corporate loans. [16] While it is possible that several lenders did overlap where evidence has been erased by the degraded state of the text, it is clear that on a larger, structural level these temples were not organized according to criteria of physical location, the size of the institution, or the amount of the loan contribution. Temples within the city center, beyond the city walls and into the Attic countryside, and those that stood along the coast are interspersed among one another. In the second corporate loan, for instance, Artemis Agrotera [17] and the Mother at Agrai [18] are the first and the penultimate lenders. These temples stand within eyesight of one another, but they appear at opposite ends of this document. The size of successive loan contributions can also stand in stark contrast. In the second loan, Herakles at Kynosarges lends 80 drachmas, [19] and, following a loan from Demophōn whose amount is not preserved, the loan from Athena Pallenis is 3,419 drachmas. [20] Neither temple location nor loan size functions as an organizational principle for the order of these transactions in these corporate loans. Chronology can also be excluded as an organizational criterion because these temples extended loans on the same day. The same Treasurers of the Other Gods were responsible for handing over both loans to the state, a certain Gorgoinos the son of Oineides from Ikaria alongside his colleagues. [21] 

Table 8. Order of Lending Temples for First and Second Loans from the Other Gods.

First Loan	Second Loan
Artemis Agrotera	Artemis Agrotera
Poseidon at Sounion	Aphrodite in the Gardens
Artemis Mounikhia	?
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	Dionysos
Muses	?
Apollo Zoster	Poseidon at Sounion
Adrasteia	?
Bendis	Artemis Mounikhia
Apollo	Theseus
Herkales at Kynosarges	Hilisos
Demophōn	Hephaistos
Athena at Pallenis	Aphrodite in the Hippolytion
Apollo	Muses
Artemis Brauronia	God of Strangers
Athena at the Derioneon Palladion	Herakles at Kynosarges
Poseidon Kalaureatis	Demophōn
–	Athena at Pallenis
–	Apollo
–	Artemis Brauronia
–	Athena at the Derioneon Palladion
–	?
–	Mother at Agrai
–	Athena Zosteria

Third, if we categorize the temples in these corporate loans according to their location in Attica, the largest number of lenders appears in and around the urban center of Athens (Tables 9 and 10). For this geographical classification, we use the Kleisthenic division of the Attic peninsula into thirds (trittyes): asty (urban area), mesogeia (inland), and paralia (coastal). The villages (demes) across the Attic peninsula that included these temples were distributed into one of these “thirds” based on their location. The classification of these temples, thus, follows that of their local deme. The majority of temples that appear on these corporate loans are located within the asty —six of nine (66%) for the first loan and eleven of fifteen (73%) for the second loan. Temples within the mesogeia and paralia comprise a distinct minority. [22] Within each geographical subcategory, there is a wide range of amounts extended in loans from several drachmas to several talents.

Table 9. Loan Size Based on Temple Location in Attica: First Loan.

Asty		Mesogeia		Paralia
Temple	Amount	Temple	Amount	Temple	Amount
Herakles at Kynosarges	20 drachmas	Artemis Brauronia	1,396 drachmas 4 obols	Poseidon at Sounion	5 talents 2,000 drachmas (+)
Bendis	86 drachmas	Athena at Pallenis	1 talent 5,200 drachmas (+)	–	–
Muses	500 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Athena Palladion	850 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Artemis Mounikhia	1 talent 4,551 drachmas 1 ½ obols	–	–	–	–
Artemis Agrotera	[Ca. 5 talents?]	–	–	–	–
(+) more than

Table 10. Loan Size Based on Temple Location in Attica: Second Loan.

Asty		Mesogeia		Paralia
Temple	Amount	Temple	Amount	Temple	Amount
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	1 drachma 2 obols (+)	Artemis Brauronia	353 drachmas 2 ½ obols	Athena Zosteria	100 drachmas (+)
Athena Palladion	2 drachmas 1 ½ obols	Athena at Pallenis	3,418 drachmas	Poseidon at Sounion	4 talents 1,527 drachmas 4 ½ obols
Herakles at Kynosarges	80 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Mother at Agrai	200 drachmas (+)	–	–	–	–
Dionysos	356 drachmas 1 obol	–	–	–	–
Hilisos (Ilissos)	402 drachmas 1 obol	–	–	–	–
Muses	521 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Theseus	808 drachmas 4 ½ obols	–	–	–	–
Hephaistos	1 talent 1,748 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Aphrodite in the Gardens	2 talents 5,175 drachmas	–	–	–	–
Artemis Agrotera	4 talents 1,950 drachmas	–	–	–	–
(+) more than

Additionally, this organization shows that temples in this second corporate loan generally extend lesser sums than those in the first loan (Table 11). This appears largely true even for temples who participated in the first loan. The temple of Herakles at Kynosarges, which is located just beyond the city walls, is the only temple to lend more funds in the second corporate loan than the first. The amounts this temple extended are the smallest relative to the others listed, but its second loan is a four-fold increase from the first. Athena Pallenis, Artemis Brauronia, Artemis Agrotera, and Poseidon at Sounion all extended larger amounts in the first corporate loan than the second. The percentage difference in principal amounts allows us to consider changes as proportional, rather than as absolute, and so are a particularly useful metric. The change begins at a decline of 19% (Artemis Agrotera), then continues to 20% (Poseidon at Sounion), 69% (Athena Pallenis) and then, finally, to 75% (Artemis Brauronia).

Table 11. Comparison of Temples That Extend Two Loans.

Temple	Loan 1 Amount	Loan 2 Amount	Loan Amount Difference First/Second Loan	Increase/Decline Loan Amount Percentage
Herakles at Kynosarges	20 drachmas	80 drachmas	+ 60 drachmas	+ 400%
Athena at Pallenis	1 talent 5,200 drachmas (+)	3,418 drachmas 1 obol	-7,782 drachmas	-69%
Artemis Brauronia	1,396 drachmas 4 obols	353 drachmas 2 ½ obols	-1,043 drachmas 1 ½ obols	-75%
Artemis Agrotera	[ca. 5 talents 1,820 drachmas]	4 talents 1,950 drachmas	-5,870 drachmas	-19%
Poseidon at Sounion	5 talents 2,000 drachmas (+)	4 talents 1,527 drachmas 4 ½ obols	-6,473 drachmas	-20%
(+) more than
[] Reconstructed amount

The Treasury of the Other Gods served as a critical financial resource to Athens in supporting its wartime operations. The timing and size of the loans from the Treasury of the Other Gods in the accounts of the Logistai present a strong case that the Athenians conceptualized funds from the Other Gods as one component of a cohesive, financial strategy. Money from the constituent temples within this treasury, thus, served to complement loans from the temple of Athena and any additional tax levies to finance the city’s war needs. The accounts of the Logistai camouflage this financial integration because the loans from the Treasury of the Other Gods are introduced under a separate heading from those from the temple of Athena Polias and are presented after the loans from Athena near the end of the document. [23] If we rearrange the loans to the Athenian state during this Panathenaic period chronologically—regardless of their origin source—we begin to see that the loans from the Other Gods closely follow those from the Temple of Athena and may have occurred in tandem with or in direct consequence of other loans from Athena (Table 12).

Table 12. Chronology of Athenian Loans from Sacred Treasuries 426/5—423/2.

Lines	Year BCE	Prytany #	Tribe	Date	Lending Source	Amount
2-6	426/25	2nd	Kekropis	4 days from entry	Athena	20 talents
6-7	426/25	2nd	Kekropis	7 days remaining	Athena	50 talents
7-9	426/25	4th	Pandion	5 days from entry	Athena	28 talents 5,610 drachmas 3 ½ obols
9-11	426/25	8th	Akamantis	5 days from entry	Athena	44 talents 3,000 drachmas
11-12	426/25	8th	Akamantis	10 days from entry	Athena	100 talents
12-14	426/25	10th	Erechtheis	7 days from entry	Athena	18 talents 3,000 drachmas
16-20	425/24	4th	Oineis	3rd day from entry	Athena	30 talents
20-22	425/24	9th	Pandion	15th day from entry	Athena	100 talents
25-29	424/23	1st	Hippothonis	26th of prytany	Athena	32 talents 5,983 drachmas
29-30	424/23	–	–	12th of prytany	Athena	23 talents (+)
31-32	424/23	–	Erectheis	–	Athena	5 talents? 4,800 drachmas?
32-33	424/23	8th	Akamantis	30th of prytany	Athena	100 talents
36-40	423/22	1st	Akamantis	12th of prytany	Athena	64 talents 4,720 drachmas
55-76	423/22	1st	Akamantis	25th of prytany	Other Gods	30 talents 5,990 drachmas
40-41	423/22	3rd	Pandion	12th of prytany	Athena	2 talents 5,500 drachmas
41-43	423/22	4th	–	4th of prytany	Athena	11 talents 3,300 drachmas
43-44	423/22	8th	Aiantis	24th of prytany	Athena	100 talents
45-46	423/22	10th	Leontis	3rd of prytany	Athena	18 talents 122 drachmas 2 ½ obols
77-96	423/22	10th	Leontis	20th of prytany	Other Gods	23 talents 5,998 drachmas

The first loan from the Other Gods, totaling 30 talents, 5,990 drachmas, appears on the twenty-fifth day of the first prytany, when the tribe Akamantis is in prytany. [24] This loan comes thirteen days after Athens borrowed 64 talents, 4,720 drachmas from the temple of Athena Polias; [25] together, the state received over 95 talents in loans during this prytany. The timing of the second corporate loan from the Other Gods occurred in the same circumstances as the first. The treasury extends its second loan, totaling 23 talents, 5,998 drachmas on the twentieth day of the tenth prytany when the tribe Leontis holds prytany. [26] Seventeen days earlier, during this same prytany, the Treasurers of Athena extend a loan of 18 talents, 122 drachmas 2 ½ obols to the state. [27] Together, during the prytany of Leontis, the last prytany of the civic calendar year, the state received just over 42 talents in loans. The exact timing of these two loans from the Other Gods relative to those from the Temple of Athena is rare. Each follows closely after a loan from the temple of Athena during the same prytany. There are only two other instances of such a close chronological relationship between loans in the accounts of the Logistai. In 426/5, two pairs of loans appear in quick succession. During the second prytany, the state received two loans from Athena around twenty-seven days apart. During the eighth prytany, the state received two loans from Athena separated by only five days. The close chronological relationship of loans from the Other Gods and from Athena (thirteen and seventeen days apart, respectively) suggests that these transactions were intentional follow-ups to previous loans and perhaps related to a military campaign. [28] As this specific type of information typically falls outside the financial purview of the accounts of the Logistai, one can only speculate about the exact intended use of these funds.

A strong parallel for this type of war financing is the Athenian expenditure for its campaign in Corcyra in 433/2. Upon entering its alliance with Corcyra, Athens voted upon an initial expedition of ten ships which, while preserving its treaty with Corinth, Sparta, and their other allies, would also, if need be, aid the Corcyreans in preventing a Corinthian landing on the island. [29] IG I³ 364 records 26 talents of funding for this initial expedition, coming thirteen days into the prytany of Aiantis. [30] On the last day of that prytany, some twenty-two/three days later, the Athenians voted an additional 50 talents for a second expedition consisting of twenty ships [31] which would assist the Corcyrean fleet against the numerically superior Corinthian navy. [32] This follow-up to initial funding was a surprise to both the Athenians present in theater and the Corcyreans who were not expecting additional support to arrive. The Athenians, on their own initiative, most likely voted for supplemental funding without having received military intelligence concerning the arrival or success of the first fleet. Athenian financing for its Corcyrean campaign could provide a framework to understand the loans from the Other Gods in the accounts of the Logistai. A foreign campaign, in this instance, receives initial financing and soon thereafter receives another monetary injection before the dēmos would be able to receive a full and accurate report from the field. [33] The Athenians, instead of spending reserve funds directly, borrow funds from two separate, sacred sources. [34]

Table 13. The Size of Athenian Loans from Sacred Treasuries 426/5–423/2 BCE.

Lines	Year	Prytany #	Tribe	Date	Lending Source	Amount
40-41	423/22	3rd	Pandion	12th of prytany	Athena	2 talents 5,500 drachmas
31-32	424/23	–	Erectheis	–	Athena	5 talents(?) 4,800 drachmas (?)
41-43	423/22	4th	–	4th of prytany	Athena	11 talents 3,300 drachmas
45-46	423/22	10th	Leontis	3rd of prytany	Athena	18 talents 122 drachmas 2 ½ obols
12-14	426/25	10th	Erechtheis	7 days from entry	Athena	18 talents 3,000 drachmas
2-6	426/25	2nd	Kekropis	4 days from entry	Athena	20 talents
29-30	424/23	–	–	12th of prytany	Athena	23 talents (+)
77-96	423/22	10th	Leontis	20th of prytany	Other Gods	23 talents 5,998 drachmas
7-9	426/25	4th	Pandion	5 days from entry	Athena	28 talents 5,610 drachmas 3 ½ obols
16-20	425/24	4th	Oineis	3rd day from entry	Athena	30 talents
55-76	423/22	1st	Akamantis	25th of prytany	Other Gods	30 talents 5,990 drachmas
25-29	424/23	1st	Hippothonis	26th of prytany	Athena	32 talents 5,983 drachmas
9-11	426/25	8th	Akamantis	5 days from entry	Athena	44 talents 3,000 drachmas
6-7	426/25	2nd	Kekropis	7 days remaining	Athena	50 talents
36-40	423/22	1st	Akamantis	12th of prytany	Athena	64 talents 4,720 drachmas
11-12	426/25	8th	Akamantis	10 days from entry	Athena	100 talents
20-22	425/24	9th	Pandion	15th day from entry	Athena	100 talents
32-33	424/23	8th	Akamantis	30th of prytany	Athena	100 talents
43-44	423/22	8th	Aiantis	24th of prytany	Athena	100 talents

The size of these loans from the Treasury of the Other Gods presents another consideration in support of understanding how these loans were incorporated into Athenian war planning (Table 13). Both the first (30 talents, 5,990 drachmas) and second corporate loans (23 talents, 5,998 drachmas) from the Other Gods are considerably smaller than the average-sized loan from Athena. The seventeen loans from the temple of Athena Polias during this Panathenaic cycle average 48 talents, 4,086 drachmas. The first loan from the Other Gods, thus, is less than two-thirds this size while the second loan is less than half this size. Since, however, the four loans of 100 talents from Athena increase the average loan size, we can reorganize the loan principals from Athena and the Other Gods to stand side-by-side to receive a more accurate understanding of their comparative size (Table 14). The most frequent magnitude of loans from Athena is <39 talents, specifically between 10 and 29 talents. Both loans from the Other Gods fall within the range of 20–39 talents. This knowledge adds to the general picture that the resources of the Other Gods complement financial transactions from Athena because they fall within the range of the prevalent size for most loans.

Table 14. Comparative Loan Size (talents) of Temple of Athena and Treasury of the Other Gods 426/5–423/2.

Lender	Loan Size (talents)
–	<9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99	100
Athena	2	3	3	2	1	1	1	–	–	–	4
Other Gods	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Furthermore, while seven of seventeen loans from Athena during this Panathenaic cycle are exact sums, neither of the loans from the Other Gods is. The round figures for Athena Polias’ loans may speak to routine transactions at a specific time of year or a specific benchmark that the state wanted to meet. For example, three of the four loans of 100 talents in the Panathenaic cycle occur in successive years, all during the eighth prytany (Table 12). Sums that are not rounded, in contrast, might be a consequence of gathering available supplemental funding to meet unexpected needs. Such available funding, when drawn both from Athena Polias and the Other Gods, would help meet the state’s financial commitments without relying too heavily on the same funding source. Indeed, Athens’ choice not to use the local sanctuaries for funding during the first three years of the Panathenaic cycle (426–424) may indicate a hesitance or inability to place any strong demand on them (Table 15).

Table 15. Summary of Loans to Athens from Athena Polias and the Other Gods.

Year(s)	Athena Polias	Other Gods
433/2–427/6	4,001 talents 4,522 drachmas	766 talents 1,099 drachmas
426/5	261 talents 5,610 drachmas 3 ½ obols	–
425/4	130 talents	–
424/3	163 talents	–
423/2	192 talents 1,642 drachmas 2 ½ obols	54 talents 5,998 drachmas
Total: 433/2–423/2	4,748 talents 5,775 drachmas	821 talents 1,087 drachmas
Adapted from Osborne and Rhodes 2017, #160:373.

Table 16. State Income (talents) on Armed Forces (433/2–423/2).

Year	Tribute Amount	Other Imperial Income	Internal surplus	War Tax	War Loans	Total
433/2	388	212	100	–	76	776
432/1	388	212	100	–	1,145	1,845
431/0	388	212	100	–	1,370	2,070
430/29	388	212	100	–	1,300	2,000
429/8	388	212	100	–	600	1,300
428/7	388	212	100	200	200	1,100
427/6	388	212	100	200	100	1,000
426/5	388	212	100	200	261	1,161
425/4	1,200	212	100	–	130	1,642
424/3	1,200	212	100	–	163	1,675
423/2	1,200	212	100	–	253	1,765
Annual Average: 1,485 talents
This table is lightly adapted from Pritchard 2018:165 Table 5.1

The tribute reassessment of 425 may partially explain the state’s decision not to draw from the Treasury of the Other Gods. As the state raised annual tribute from 388 to 1,200 talents, this added income could have created enough revenue that the state chose against borrowing from the Other Gods (Table 16). Pritchard argues that previous to the tribute reassessment, the state borrowed heavily from sacred reserves because its expenditure outstripped its income from phoros and other sources. Once the tribute level was raised, the need to rely upon sacred resources and internal taxation fell sharply. [35] He estimates that the state’s expenditure on military affairs averaged 1,485 talents between 433/2 and 423/2. If state income from trade and taxes were to remain steady during this period, as Pritchard contends, he interprets borrowing money and spending tribute revenue as two components of a zero-sum game. Once there was a large-scale increase in tribute, the state decreased its borrowing of sacred resources. As the tabulation of state expenditure does not survive in the historical record, this reconstruction of financing is an attractive, yet ultimately speculative, hypothesis.

The relationship between the Treasurers of the Other Gods—the state—and the local temples that comprised this treasury has been the subject of extended debate. The nature of this relationship is important to understand because it directly influences the context of these loan transactions. Wade-Gery interpreted the creation of the Treasury of the Other Gods and the transfer of local religious property to the acropolis as a sign of total state control of local religious and financial matters. [36] Linders clearly shows that local temples had some control over their own cult paraphernalia and revenue after the passage of the Kallias decree and argues that temples only transferred a portion of their revenue or cult material to the acropolis. [37] She uses the example of IG I³ 84, the rental contract of Neleus, Basile, and Kodrus, which states that rent from this estate is to be paid to the official state receivers (apodektai) and then onwards to the Treasurers of the Other Gods. [38] The renter, however, has control over the sale of mud from a ditch on the property and the proceeds from this sale are paid to Neleus. [39] The broad framework of the working relationship between the state and local temples gives the impression that the Treasurers of the Other Gods act as a bridge between these two parties. Their general responsibilities, gathered from the epigraphic record, appear to be helping to facilitate loan repayments from the state, conducting inventories of the objects in the treasury on the acropolis, and extending funds to help reconstruct and beautify temples in Attica. [40] The finer details of local control of revenue or state influence in the transfer of property via the Treasurers of the Other Gods do not survive in the epigraphic record. This silence extends to the bureaucratic procedure by which these treasurers received loans from local temples. As such, the language used to talk about these loans is often neutral because it is unclear whether the sums are dictated by the treasurers or they are volunteered by individual temples. These loan amounts are sometimes referred to as “contributions,” a term that could equally reflect their status as either obligatory or voluntary.

These temples are unified on this inscription by their financial generosity to the state, but the format of this document bears several consequences on its interpretation. The list of temples and loan amounts standardize the actions of these temples for ease of reading and interpretation. This document, however, flattens out the internal dynamics of these institutions which resulted in their decisions to lend. It draws focus away from the numerous temples that did not extend loans and away from the individual amounts that temples made available. Aside from the temple of Artemis Agrotera, which is listed first on both corporate loans, the attention of the reader is focused on the presence of a temple and the amount that it loaned, and not on whether a temple’s contributions varied from one loan to the next. The accounts of the Logistai do not include the larger context of the decision the temples had to make about whether or not to extend a loan to the state, and in what amount. Potentially important factors would have been difficulty in procuring funds; a desire to keep some funds at these local temples for expenditure on sacrifices, festivals, or sacred business throughout the year; or, perhaps, a local unwillingness to transfer and lend funds to the state. As the accounts of the Logistai list financial contributions to the state, the dynamics of internal decision-making fall beyond its purview. The state, therefore, constructs this document to highlight a series of uniform financial services rendered to itself. Any internal decisions from these local temples would not otherwise appear on this account. The constituent temples, which are recorded in various orders of loan size and location, emphasize the democratic nature of participation in the state’s affairs. Each temple appears to be equally motivated to lend, and the state itself does not favor or accentuate one loan over another. More significantly, this document presents each temple as a peer and thus equally motivated to lend, regardless of whatever local circumstances may have existed.

This desire to be recorded as having provided funds to Athens may explain the loans of small—or, for some, nearly inconsequential—value to the war: 2 drachmas, 1 ½ obols (Athena at the Palladion); 20 drachmas (Herakles at Kynosarges); 80 drachmas (Herakles at Kynosarges); and 86 drachmas (Adrasteia, Bendis). Such small loans most likely had little or no impact on the war effort and so appear to be both lacking any rationale and to have no functional purpose. These loans are so minute, especially when compared to those of Athena, that one led Thompson to believe that it was actually an interest payment [41] and caused Rhodes and Osborne to question the functional value of the loan itself. [42] The scale of these financial transactions, however, has served as an impediment towards understanding the motivations of local temples to lend. Their small size has not generated the interest that Athena’s much larger loans have and, as a result, they have been largely ignored. Documenting public participation in the health and safety of the state was a primary consideration of loan behavior, the financial amount of a monetary contribution, a secondary consideration. Small financial contributions, despite this silence, are not unique in the financial history of the Delian League; they often appear in the Athenian tribute lists. League members’ dedications of an aparkhē of their phoros payments to Athena were often very small sums, quite comparable to these loans from the Other Gods. Their limited financial value or usefulness to the cult of Athena is subordinate to projecting faithful membership in the league, political solidarity with the hegemonic state, and honoring Athena. In IG I³ 278, the tribute list for 434/3, several league members supplied extremely small amounts to Athena including the Kystirioi (5 drachmas), the Pharbelioi (8 drachmas, 2 obols), Pistasos (8 drachmas, 2 obols), and Piloros (10 drachmas). [43] These sums are by no means merely symbolic and their size is irrelevant to the allied commitment to serving in the Delian League. The small loan amounts from the Other Gods, in the context of participating in state affairs should be interpreted in the same manner. This public documentation of their participation in state affairs was of greater value to these institutions than the actual size of their contribution. [44] Or, to put this in the state’s perspective, there is no contribution too small to be offered official, public recognition.

The state’s perspective of the contributory nature of these loans to the larger project of war financing and its acknowledgment of these contributions appears in Perikles’ speech to the Athenian assembly where he tries to convince the dēmos of the prospects for its future success against Sparta. Thucydides articulates Perikles’ strategy which included: evacuating the people of the countryside to inside the city walls; not offering battle to the Spartans; having their navy in a high state of readiness; and keeping firm hold on their allies. To drive home to the assembly the necessity of Athenian revenues and other resources as keys to victory, Perikles lists these resources, from monetary to manpower to physical defenses. Perikles’ discussion of finances is worth listing in full:

After providing precise figures for the annual overseas revenue including the phoros (600 talents) and the financial reserve (at one point 9,700 talents), Perikles’ exactitude transforms into generalized, round figures. Uncoined metal, dedications, and Persian war spoils amount to not less than 500 talents “οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων” [45] while the golden robes of Athena, totaling 40 talents of gold, could also be melted down and coined, should the state need emergency financing. The contents of the Treasury of the Other Gods receive the most generalized treatment of any resource as the treasures therein are described as “not few in number and which they might employ.” [46] Perikles’ knowledge of Athenian financial holdings, no doubt, comes from his long-term service as general and displays itself in his impressive transmission of numbers. [47] Each successive category of funding Perikles names goes further away from what he views as the primary source of war financing, phoros, and, therefore, the increasingly more generalized figures reinforce the importance of allied tribute. The financial resources of the Other Gods are displayed as potential contributions, but ones not to the scale of league tribute.

Perikles’ vague statement as to the monetary holdings of the Other Gods does not align with their large, recent contributions to Delian League operations if my chronology for the decree is correct. The Kallias decree (433/2) called for the repayment of what is probably a significant total of debt owed to the Other Gods who had extended loans to the state prior to the creation of the treasury on the acropolis. [48] Furthermore, the period between 433/2 and 427/6 covered in the accounts of the Logistai tabulates 800 talents in loans from the Other Gods to the state. [49] It is quite possible that one or more loans from this source was outstanding at the time of Perikles’ remarks. As Perikles’ objective, however, is to convince the dēmos of his financial strategy moving forward and not provide a summary of previous transactions, he emphasizes the importance of annual revenue for war operations, specifically through tribute. The Other Gods are, thus, placed nearly last in his list as a separate source of income. This categorization of war financing here presented through the mouth of Perikles prioritizes tribute—at the very least—and places all other financing sources as secondary. This classification schema may, perhaps, be echoed in the construction of the accounts of the Logistai. Although produced around ten years after Perikles’ speech, the organization of the document centers on the sources of financing and not on a chronological record of financing. Loans from the Other Gods to the state are chronologically interspersed with those from Athena, but the way in which state officials present these transactions are that loans from Athena appear first and those from Other Gods second.

Table 17. The Appearance of the Other Gods at Athens.

Temple	Treasury of the Other Gods	First Loan	Second Loan
Artemis Agrotera	X	X	X
Poseidon at Sounion	X	X	X
Athena at Pallenis	X	X	X
Demophōn	X	X	X
Herakles at Kynosarges	X	X	X
Artemis Mounikhia	X	X	X
Adrasteia and Bendis	X	X (but separate)	–
Hephaistos	X	–	X
Theseus	X	–	X
Dionysos	X	–	X
Mother at Agrai	X	–	X
Hilisos (Ilissos)	X	–	X
Aphrodite in the Gardens	X	–	X
God of Foreigners	X	–	X
Aphrodite in the Hippolytion	–	X	X
Muses	–	X	X
Apollo	–	X	X
Artemis Brauronia	–	X	X
Athena at the Derioneon Palladion	–	X	X
Gaia Olympia	X	–	–
Hera in Xypete	X	–	–
Zeus Olympios	X	–	–
Poseidon Hippios	X	–	–
Hermes and Artemis	X	–	–
Hekate	X	–	–
Zeus Kenaios	X	–	–
Zeus Polios	X	–	–
Ion from Pleistieia	X	–	–
Athena Itonia	X	–	–
Apollo Delios in Phaleron	X	–	–
Apollo Paionos	X	–	–
Apollo Pythios	X	–	–
Meliteus?	X	–	–
Twelve Gods?	X	–	–
Apollo Zoster	–	X	–
Adrasteia	–	X	–
Apollo (?)	–	X	–
Poseidon Kalaureatis	–	X	–
Athena Zosteria	–	–	X

The varying participation of Attic temples lending to the state in the accounts of the Logistai grows more pronounced when one contrasts these temples with those included in the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods (IG I³ 383). This inscription, dating to 429/8, is extremely fragmentary and not all of its fragments have been securely placed (Table 17). [50] This inventory records funds and precious items transferred to the acropolis from temples throughout Athens and Attica and deposits and withdrawals from the Treasury of the Other Gods. The temples included in the accounts of the Logistai are a subset of those that both had a treasury on the acropolis and loaned money to the state. The inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods reveals a minimum of thirty-nine temples. [51] When we compare the number of temples included in the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods to the temples that lent to the state in the accounts of the Logistai, we see that eleven temples lend twice (28%), thirteen lend once (33%), and fifteen temples are not recorded as lending to the state at all (38%). From the surviving records, it appears that the majority of temples extant in this document (71%) lend only once or not at all during the period of 426/5–423/2. [52] Several of the temples that do not lend to the state—Gaia Olympia, Zeus Olympios, Hekate, the Twelve Gods (?)— are located in the asty, and challenge the findings in Tables 9 and 10 that temples within this area are most likely to lend. Uncovering the motivation or logic behind temples choosing not to lend is extremely difficult because of the poor state of preservation of IG I³ 383, the pertinent section of IG I³ 369, and a lack of evidence from these temples themselves. Thucydides presents the acute, popular anger of those having to abandon their homes and local temples in the countryside to evacuate into the asty, [53] but this resentment does not produce additional evidence in the historical or epigraphical record (Tables 9 and 10). [54] That only two temples from the mesogeia and two from the paralia appear as lenders can only be treated as an anomaly of survival which may change with either subsequent readings of these inscriptions or discoveries of further fragments.

Artemis Agrotera extended more than 9 talents in loans to the state in the course of a single year (423/2) and this section argues that traditional sources of sacred revenue and the framework for conceptualizing sacred finances cannot explain Artemis’ monetary holdings. Scholars have not investigated the lending activity of Artemis Agrotera for several reasons. First, the epigraphic evidence for this activity, IG I³ 383 and the lower portion of IG I³ 369, exists in a poorly preserved state. [55] There have been numerous attempts to identify the divinities on these documents and the amounts they lent, but this has not generated sustained interest in understanding the financial holdings or capabilities of these local temples. The disappointing information these inscriptions provide is, at times, the only evidence for the existence of certain cults, which makes further financial investigation not possible at present time. [56] Scholarly attention on these inscriptions has instead focused on two areas: an inventory of cults residing in fifth-century Athens for evidence of religious life and providing critical information on the civic and political calendrical dating systems. Both avenues have produced numerous, very specialized studies. [57]

Furthermore, the lack of investigation into Artemis Agrotera’s financial transactions in these documents reveals the current objectives of, and limitations to, approaches towards sacred finance. This particular field of research, despite recent, intense interest in the ancient Greek economy, is still largely immature. [58] One branch of this research investigates the broader contributions of religious institutions to economic development by drawing on evidence from a range of temples. [59] According to this line of inquiry, temples aid in establishing value in ancient Greek society by serving as centers of economic exchange through their ability to gather (and compensate) labor, construction materials, and animals for sacrifice. These economic functions are magnified as temples also serve as repositories for cultural history and memory, [60] as display venues for objects constructed from valuable materials, and as destinations for religious travelers. Evidence from specific temples is thus incorporated to provide examples for general patterns of economic and cultural behavior, not to reconstruct the finances of these institutions.

A second, larger strand of research has focused on individual sources of sanctuary revenue. Unlike the broader studies in the previous category, this approach focuses on a specific source of income from a number of temples, or, at times, on evidence from one individual temple. The principal streams of revenue investigated include property rentals, taxation/fees, loans, and the dedication of spoils. The largest body of investigative work on sanctuary revenue appears in leases of sanctuary-owned land, estates, farms, or houses. [61] Land is the most common asset that temples held, [62] and many temples leased land under contract. These lease agreements are often recorded in stone and preserve important legal, prosopographic, and economic information about the condition of the land, the collection of payment, and the renters themselves. Cult fees and taxes are a second source of temple financing. They can apply to a range of items or activities that included entrance fees. [63] Sanctuaries also earned income through lending. Major examples include Athena Polias in Athens and the temple of Apollo at Delos. The political and military context of the loans in Athens and the vast sums these temples extended to the city have drawn significant attention. Beyond Athens, the polis of Delos received one loan from the sanctuary of Apollo during the time of the island’s political independence in the Hellenistic period which is marked for defense against pirates. [64] The last major form of revenue derives from the dedication of gifts or war spoils. The financial windfall from war spoils could be massive. Pausanias reports that the temple of Zeus at Olympia along with its chryselephantine cult statue were financed from war spoils seized by the Eleans after defeating Pisa. [65] Oftentimes this dedication took the form of a dekatē, where around one-tenth of the objects or the value of the objects seized was placed in a temple. [66] These dedications could take the form of military equipment, monumental dedications, or even money.

The knowledge gained from this second avenue of investigation deepens our understanding of the organization of temple revenue, but it is limited in its ability to illuminate larger patterns of temple financing. Many sacred institutions had specialized sources of income, such as oracles (Delphi) and banks (Delos), which cannot be directly compared to one another and were relatively rare processes in the ancient world. As temples often had multiple sources of revenue, the investigation of only a single source provides a limited window to temple financing. It is only through wholistic investigation into a temple’s revenues and expenses that one can begin to understand how these religious institutions economically operated over the course of antiquity. [67] The results of this type of inquiry, thus, counterbalance the general picture created in the first avenue of study, but it does not create a complete picture of temple financing.

The investigation into Artemis Agrotera’s finances reveal three sources of income: land rentals, dedications, and loans. These revenues have never been integrated into an economic study of Artemis’ assets on account of the fragmentary state of the evidence; [68] only Artemis Agrotera’s land rentals have received sustained attention. [69] Artemis’ landed properties first appear at the end of the Classical period (343/2) when the state leased them. Her holdings included three properties: a chōrion with an oikia, another chōrion, and an oikia in Kollyton next to the Eilytheion. [70] Unfortunately, the inscriptions neither provide any detail that would narrow the broad definition of a chōrion as “landed property” or “estate” [71] nor do they list the contents of such estates. The properties listed in these loans were most likely located in three separate locations. [72] Walbank identifies the renters of these properties with established, wealthy families and office holders, which reflects the importance of the cult Artemis Agrotera in the political and religious life in the city. [73] Together, these properties brought the temple 1,401 drachmas of annual rent. [74] This amount, although respectable for a temple of such a modest size, is, however, too small to explain how Artemis Agrotera was able to gather and lend almost 10 talents within the time between construction of its temple (ca. 440) and the close of the Archidamian phase of the war (423/2). If the source of funding for these loans was land rentals alone, it would have taken over thirty-eight years to gather this amount of money. [75] There is no evidence that Artemis Agrotera owned landed estates in the fifth century, but, even if the temple did, the revenue from her estates alone does not account for the origin of this large sum loaned to the state. Other forms of revenue will have to explain the source of these temple loans.

Dedicatory objects could be another possible source of Artemis’ funding, but scant evidence survives. Two inventory documents (ca. 420–405) mention Artemis Agrotera, but both are too fragmentary to be able to draw firm conclusions about the scale of Artemis’ holdings. [76] These two documents date to the period just following the Archidamian phase of the Peloponnesian War and the publication of the accounts of the Logistai. The first, [77] IG I³ 406, reveals a silver kylix with a weight of 310 drachmas attached to Artemis, [78] while the second, IG I³ 409, is so poorly preserved that it is not possible to see what the specified (additional) holdings of the goddess were. [79] Similar to the evidence from Artemis’ lease holdings, that of dedicatory objects does not survive in great abundance and does not provide a compelling case for how Artemis Agrotera was able to procure the large amount of money that it loaned to the state in 423/2.

The source of money responsible for Artemis’ loans, I argue, is war spoils. The foundation of this temple was ca. 440. While the cult may have been accumulating assets since Marathon or perhaps Salamis, the building project would have absorbed considerable resources. Yet, it appears the assets of the cult so far exceeded its modest rent income that committing to its loans (423/2) was not a problem. Artemis Agrotera’s holdings in the Treasury of the Other Gods and the political context for the erection of her temple and the sacrifice performed at her festival provide compelling circumstantial evidence that war spoils were the major source of income for this temple. The timing of construction hints at a decision taken soon after the Thirty Years’ Peace. Artemis Agrotera most likely received these spoils from Athenian hoplites or perhaps even allied troops who had operated in homeland Greece, and were now relieved from the worries of further military expenditures. The temple, further, attempted to grow its financial asset base by extending these spoils as loans to the state where they would receive interest and additional income for the sanctuary.

The Temple of Artemis Agrotera stood in Agrai across from the Panathenaic Stadium on the east bank of the Ilissos River. [80] It is a small Ionic temple constructed ca. 440 and built to an amphiprostyle plan with four columns along its eastern and western sides. At the stylobate, it measures 5.8 by 12.6 meters. This temple has a large pronaos that lacks evidence for either columns or pillars in antis (although they are reconstructed in some plans) [81] and lacks an opisthodomos on account of the size of its pronaos. Little remains of the temple today as it was disassembled by Turkish authorities in 1778 for defensive works. The few pieces that remain are well-worn and distributed across several museums in Europe.

The importance of Artemis Agrotera as a lending institution speaks directly to the strength of the Athenian military, of Athenian democratic institutions in which classes of ephebes trained to become hoplites, and to Athens’ position as head of the Delian League. Religious activities for this cult, such as sacrifice, feasting, and dedication, served two purposes: they celebrated past Athenian military success beginning against Persian forces at Marathon, and they represented an annual state-sanctioned festival reaffirming Athenian military power into the future. The vast majority of literary and epigraphic evidence for this temple is directly tied to this festival. Xenophon [82] writes that the sacrifice to Artemis, which continued to his own time at the temple of Artemis Agrotera, had originated at the battle of Marathon. [83] The Athenians had initially vowed to sacrifice a goat for each Persian killed in battle. As the number of Persian dead was quite high—Herodotus [84] reports the figure of 6,400 killed in battle—Xenophon says the Athenians instead offered 500 goats for sacrifice each year because they could not acquire enough animals to fulfill their original vow. [85] The scale of the feast, even pared down from its original, intended size, would be a visual reminder of the scale of Persian defeat. The date for this sacrifice, 6 Boedromion, is Artemis’ feast day and the date on which the Athenians celebrated the victory at Marathon. [86]

The connection between Athenian soldiers and the temple of Artemis Agrotera is reinforced by ephebic participation in the festival. As a collective unit, ephebes processed from the city to the temple. [87] Following their arrival, one text shows that ephebes assisted the polemarch, [88] the chief civil magistrate with titular responsibility over military affairs, in carrying out the sacrifice of five hundred she-goats. [89] Future hoplites thus aided in bringing to fruition a sacrificial vow previous generations of Athenian citizens made on the eve of battle. [90] As the political environment surrounding the foundation of this temple and its principal festival center on the celebration of Athenian military deeds, we surely will not go far wrong in extending this martial context for interpreting temple activities to the dedicatory and lending activity therein which is preserved in the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods.

The inventory contains one mention of the temple of Artemis Agrotera, [91] another reconstructed reference, [92] and three other mentions of Artemis which may or may not be associated with Agrotera. [93] The most secure reference to the temple of Artemis Agrotera refers to the dedication of a dekatē from the sale of either war captives or slaves whose amount does not survive (IG I³ 383 col. II. fr. V.155–158): [Ἀ]ρτέμιδος|[Ἀ]γροτέρας|[δ]εκάτεν ἀν|δ̣ραπόδον. Although the inscription does not name the campaign that generated captives thus sold, one might speculate that it refers to a recent campaign because the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods inscribes the deposits, withdrawals, and inventories for a single year. The military action that is chronologically closest to the publication of IG I³ 383 is the Athenian capture of twelve Peloponnesian ships and some of their crews at Naupaktos in 429. [94] Should this be the case, the sale of captives, the dedication of funds into the temple of Artemis, and then the transfer of these funds to the Treasury of the Other Gods must have occurred in an expedient fashion.

Artemis Agrotera’s transfer of a dekatē to the acropolis (429/8) and its extension of two loans (423/2) show a pattern of investment in the state’s war financing and economic innovation in the methods with which it carried out its religious transactions. The decision of Artemis’ dedicators to preserve the dekatē as liquid currency and to extend this money to the state is part of a broader development of the monetization of religious dedications and the desire to convert these dedications from static, valuable display objects into kinetic, active forms of state financing. The framework of this development began at a polis level with Athenian economic transactions related to Delian League financing. Over the course of the mid-fifth century towards the third quarter of the fifth century, these developments clearly influenced local Attic religious institutions, which subsequently adopted this model of economic exchange with the Athenian state. As these same local institutions did not have the scale of the annual revenue stream that Athena Polias received in aparkhai from phoros, they relied upon their own means such as land rentals and private dedications to gather and extend money to the state. In the case of Artemis Agrotera, this temple may well have benefitted from individuals acting as citizen-hoplites who dedicated objects and funds seized from warfare.

The transformation of dekatai from dedications of material objects of warfare and valuable objets d’art to monetary contributions extends from the sixth to the fourth century. Dekatai in sixth- and early fifth-century Athens appear as dedicatory objects such as statues, [95] cult tables, [96] and clothing. [97] Neither bullion nor coined money appears to be dedicated, but money is sometimes referenced as the source of the dedication. [98] During this same period, dekatai that are dedicated from battlefield contexts are the objects of warfare themselves; these include helmets and spear butts. [99] Nearing the end of the Archaic period and entering the Classical, dekatai from these contexts begin to transition from the objects of warfare into artistic monuments crafted from precious materials, and then, finally, to money itself. [100] In 506, Athens dedicated a dekatē of the proceeds from its sale of war captives seized from Boeotia and Chalcis as a quadriga monument. The original base of the monument (base A) reads: [101]

The text on the following base (base B) has been heavily restored on the basis of Herodotus, which, however, transposes lines 1 and 3 from base A. [102]

The text of the quadriga monument that Herodotus quotes (base B) was, most likely, that which appeared after base A was destroyed following the Persian sack of the acropolis. The massive bronze statue of Athena Promachos, which stood around nine meters tall, was created by Pheidias as a dekatē to Athena following the victory at Marathon. [104] Artemis Agrotera’s transfer to the acropolis of this monetized dekatē is the end stage of the slow evolution of this type of dedication from a display object of military victory used in battle, to a conspicuous offering to the gods from the proceeds of the sale of war spoils, to the dedication of funds received from the sale of objects of spoil. Dedicatory behavior in the temples on the acropolis, of course, still included physical objects of warfare and artwork created from the sale of spoils, but there are two parallel developments for which Artemis Agrotera is an example: the gradual monetization of this specific form of dedication of a tithe; and the gradual monetization of dedicatory activity, which is a broader, fifth-century development in Athens itself. Whereas earlier forms of this dedication are objective signs of previous military victory, coinage can signify both funds seized from campaigns abroad, and also financial readiness for warfare, a point which Perikles himself belabors to the Athenian assembly on the eve of opening hostilities. [105]

Beyond the voluntary context of a dekatē, the epidekaton is firmly established in Athens in the fifth century as a religious component to penalties resulting from failure to abide by Athenian law. [106] This type of dedication is the surrender of one-tenth of one’s property to a divinity. The temple can financially benefit from the property itself or from the proceeds it receives from said property at auction. An epidekaton transforms a traditional form of dedication into a penalty and accelerates the monetization of cult practices and finances. [107] Some of the major locations in which the epidekaton appears are documents relating to the conduct of Delian League affairs. Following the conclusion of the revolt of Chalcis from Athens in 446, the oath which everyone of military age in Chalcis was to swear includes assurances that they will be a most faithful ally to Athens, pay whatever tribute the Athenians decide, and not revolt or harbor anyone who does. [108] Should any military-age male not swear this oath, the decree lays out penalties depriving him of his rights as citizen and of his property with an epidekaton going to Olympian Zeus. [109] The procedure for the foundation of the Athenian colony at Brea, between 440 and 432, follows the same outlines for penalties as the previous inscription. After the Brea document discusses the division of land, the confirmation of Demokleides as leader of the venture, the creation of a sacred precinct, and the obligation of colonists to bring a cow and panoply to the Great Panathenaia and a phallos to the Dionysia, [110] the inscription eventually turns to penalties to be incurred should anyone attempt to prevent the execution of any of these measures. The male transgressor (and his children) will be deprived of his citizen rights, and his property (τὰ χ]ρέματα) will be confiscated with an epidekaton given to the God. [111] In the Thoudippos decree (425/4), harsh penalties identical to those discussed above are outlined for anyone who would attempt to prevent the assessment of tribute during the Great Panathenaia: being deprived of one’s rights and having one’s property confiscated by the state with an epidekaton going to the God. [112] Athena Polias and the Athenian state are thus able to derive income both from the compliance of its political allies in the Delian League along with its own citizens for following state law and from foreign entities and individuals (foreign and domestic) who disobey Athenian law. Athena Polias would, therefore, share in the state’s wealth from tribute, any windfall from the spoils of war, and from the auction of seized property.

The surrender of Mytilene to Athenian forces in 427 and the subsequent land division on Lesbos shows this framework of providing a divinity an epidekaton expanded to an island-sized scale. Although not referred to in Thucydides’ text specifically as an epidekaton, the resulting punishment of the island after its unsuccessful revolt (except for Methymna) follows the provisions of earlier Athenian decrees. [113] The island was divided into 3,000 klēroi which would be settled by Athenian kleruchs. The Lesbians would farm this land and would pay a rent of two minae (200 drachmas) per klēros per year to the state and no longer pay tribute. One-tenth of those land parcels—three hundred total—were set aside and held sacred to the gods. Most likely, this meant that the annual rent from these parcels, 60,000 drachmas or 10 talents, was directed to the Treasury of Athena. [114] Although the Parthenon clearly shows war dedications from the campaign in Lesbos including a helmet, a shield, and several silver cups, [115] this dedication of an epidekaton, one that results from a legal break from Athens, here shows a shift in thinking in how the state decides to monetize and maximize its victories for its religious institutions: directing a revenue stream towards them to increase their liquid holdings, no doubt in part as security against the need for future borrowing. [116] The amount of this annual revenue, when compared with the loans from the Other Gods at the end of the Logistai Accounts, is not insubstantial. Ten talents is more than double the size of any loan principal from the constituent temples of the Other Gods: the next largest sums are those of Artemis Agrotera (first loan: 5 talents) and Poseidon at Sounion (first loan: 5 talents, 2,000+ drachmas). The addition of these funds would supplement the aparkhē from league allies and voluntary contributions from these local institutions whose amounts, as we have seen, might fluctuate from loan to loan, and, potentially, from year to year.

This exploration into the broadening definition and monetization of the dekatē in fifth-century Athens is part of a larger development of the monetization of religious dedications for the purpose of effecting economic transactions. The greatest example of this development, of course, is the dedication of aparkhai from the tribute-paying members of the Delian League. At the inception of this league, members who paid for their membership in hard coin most likely dedicated an aparkhē to Apollo at Delos, which then served as the seat of the league treasury. When the league treasury was transferred to Athens in 455/4, the appearance of the Athenian tribute lists, inscriptions publishing the aparkhai given to Athena from the contributions of the allies, provides a fuller picture regarding this monetization. These aparkhai funds, then, were drawn upon to pay for materials and labor for the acropolis building project. [117]

The increased appearance of coined money at temples through allied aparkhai and epidekata fines begins to be documented as dedications from private individuals. Soon after the appearance of the records of the Treasurers of Athena in 434/3, religious dedications of coined money begin to appear on the acropolis and eventually appear in the treasuries of the Opisthodomos, [118] the Parthenon, [119] and the Hekatompedon. [120] Coinage can appear in these treasuries without any further contextual information about the dedicator or the intended dedicatory purpose of the funds. [121] In several instances, the dedicator is identified through his act. A certain Thrasyllos son of Euonymon, for example, dedicates two Aeginetan staters and a gold half-obol in the Hekatompedon (398/7). [122] Rarely is the name of the divinity included in the dedication; there is only one surviving example of this from Athens. Demeter and Kore are the recipients of forty-three gold Darics in the Hekatompedon (394/3). [123] The dedication of an aparkhē as a monetized offering from Delian League members now appears from a private individual: a certain Andron of Elaious dedicated two gold drachmas to the Hekatompedon as a first-fruits offering (398/7). [124] These dedications allow individuals to be able to participate in the religious and economic well-being of the temple by dedicating an item that could be used for its economic benefit. [125] Individuals, thus, who are dedicating coins onto the acropolis are carrying out the same actions as those who are dedicating to local Attic temples in the last quarter of the fifth century. [126] It is this context of dedicating coinage that explains the behavior, I believe, of the transfer of coinage from the temple of Artemis Agrotera to the Treasury of the Other Gods. The framework of dedicating money as an offering had already been established by the state. Both the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods and the accounts of the Logistai reveal the transfer of this style of dedication to local institutions and to the individuals who use them.

The dedication of funds related to wartime activities in the temple of Artemis Agrotera (dekatē) may explain another set of dedications in the Treasury of the Other Gods which originally appeared in the temple of Artemis: dedications of currency. Listed together as a single entry in the Treasury of the Other Gods (IG I³ 383) are currencies from eight separate city-states: staters from Cyzikos, Aegina, Corcyra, and Corinth as well as coinage from Samos, Boeotia, Chalcedon, and Phocis. [127] Such a dedication of foreign coinage is unique in the inventory of the Treasury of the Other Gods. How this collection of foreign currency came to be dedicated in the temple of Artemis could have several explanations, such as being offered by private individuals, merchants, or foreign public officials who passed this temple upon entering or exiting the city. A stronger suggestion, however, based on the context of religious activity at this temple, is that Athenian soldiers or sailors recovered this currency while serving abroad and dedicated it upon returning home. [128] A survey of the locations from which these coins originated reveals that Athens conducted operations in several of these theaters in the opening phase of the war or faced off against Peloponnesian allied troops at these locations. [129]

The strongest cases for a wartime context for these dedications are the coinage from Aegina, Corcyra, Corinth, and Chalcis. In 433, in an aforementioned campaign, Athens sent out two detachments of triremes to aid Corcyra against Corinthian forces, those of its metropolis. [130] After battling one another, Thucydides notes, it became difficult to distinguish the ships from victorious and defeated sides of the engagement, [131] and wreckage and deceased were spread over the battlefield. [132] Later on, the current had scattered the flotsam in all directions. [133] Athenian aid to Corcyra at this early stage in the war would have given sailors the opportunity to acquire coinage from pulling into port or through the act of collecting the deceased which had become interspersed on account of the currents. Athenian assistance to Corcyrean democrats extends through a civil war, presenting numerous additional opportunities for Athenians to acquire this coinage. [134]

Coinage from the Chalcidice and Corinth, meanwhile, could have come from Athenian soldiers returning from Potidaea, which had been invested by Athenian siege since 431. Potidaea was a Corinthian colony and, perhaps, a later member of the Chalcidian league, which had its own coinage. Corinth sent a force of 1,600 soldiers—both Corinthian and mercenary soldiers—under the command of Aristeus to support its colony during the siege. Aristeus directly engaged an Athenian force outside the city walls, an event which proved indecisive, but the Athenians set up a trophy afterwards and then returned the war dead to the Potidaeans under truce. [135] At the conclusion of the siege, Athenian generals negotiated the city’s surrender under the terms that the inhabitants could depart with one garment of clothing (two for women) and a certain amount of money for travel; [136] the remainder of their property was available for Athenian troops to plunder. The Corinthian coinage in these dedications, thus, may not indicate physical presence of Athenian soldiers in the Corinthia, but rather, allied troops in the Peloponnesian league traveling to Corcyra and Potidaea in support of their soldiers.

In the summer of 431, Athenian forces expelled the population of Aegina under the charge that the Aeginetans had precipitated the opening of the hostilities of the Peloponnesian war. [137] To fill the vacuum left on the island, and because of the island’s proximity to the Peloponnese, Athens sent over colonists (epoikoi) as a security measure. [138] The remaining coinage from these dedications belongs to parties which make either a brief appearance in historical accounts of the war or, in the case of Cyzicus, only appear after the peace of Nikias. Both Boeotia and Phocis appear in 431 where both entities are components of the initial Peloponnesian invasion force headed by Spartan King Archidamos. [139] Cyzicus is a long-standing member of the Delian League, but Cyzicene coinage circulated widely and was used as a large-scale denomination for payments. [140]

The motivation for this set of dedications, thus, may reinforce the martial political environment in which this temple was constructed, the importance of the annual festival at this temple celebrating the Athenian victory at Marathon against Persian forces, the previous dedication of funds from the sale of war captives, and, generally, the strength and resolve of Athenian forces in their military objectives. This money, in being dedicated to Artemis, is not simply a display item resulting from martial skill, but an active economic contributor to future Athenian action and success in the field, financed by the spoils of defeated enemies.

The collection of temples comprising the Treasury of the Other Gods represents a broad sweep of religious life in the Athenian city center, the Attic countryside, and Attic border sanctuaries. These local temples were centers of religious importance and were critical sources of war financing for Athens. The transfer of wealth from these temples to the safety of the acropolis kept these funds in a state of readiness should the state call upon them for economic assistance. Athens incorporated these temples into a financial system of sacred loans supporting military preparation and action, a system which had already been established since at least the transfer of the Delian League treasury in 455/4. The Kallias decree may indicate that Athens had already drawn from these temples before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to pay off outstanding interest and debts. The revenue streams of these local temples, however, did not annually replenish their coffers through (most likely) land rentals and fees to the degree that Athena Polias’ holdings were fed by aparkhai dedications. The state, therefore, interacted with the temples in the Treasury of the Other Gods as an important, supplementary source of funding, but was careful not to draw too heavily from them. The funds from these temples were locally generated, voluntarily transferred to the acropolis, and only then extended as loans; thus, the state could only depend upon them to the extent that local income permitted. During the Archidamian phase of the war, the state elected not to borrow funds from the Other Gods for a period of three years (426/5–424/3). The transfer of a temple’s funds to the acropolis did not necessitate that this temple lend those funds to the state. Indeed, a minority of local temples extended loans, while others appeared to have kept their wealth on the acropolis to collect dust rather than interest. The temples in the Inventory (IG I³ 383) and the accounts of the Logistai (IG I³ 369) all cooperate with the state—unlike, for example, Nemesis at Rhamnous which does not appear at all—but there is a gradation for their level of participation: all temples transfer their holdings, few temples lend, and fewer still lend twice. These documents display democratic participation in state affairs, even for lenders of extremely small amounts. At the same time, however, and with each transaction, they challenge the unified political front that Athens presents to the wider public during wartime.

These loans are proof of the transfer and adaptation of state-level processes of lending onto local institutions and even onto the individuals whom they served. The temple of Athena Polias had a circular financial relationship with the state: large, regular dedications like the tribute aparkhai and epidekata from confiscations enabled regular lending to the state. The local temples, however, had no such financial capability; their ability to lend money to the state was limited by the revenues they generated through the rentals, the fees, or the individual or collective dedications they received. Nevertheless, these temples and the individuals whom they served accepted this framework, and some indeed engaged in financial behavior that accelerated the process of maximizing the benefit of dedications through monetization. State recognition of these local financial contributions through formal publication legitimized this process. The inclusion of some local temples on a state account or inventory may have placed social pressure on other temples to participate in the system and conform to state expectations.

The temple of Artemis Agrotera is one example of an institution whose worshippers were highly motivated, civic-minded, and politically active individuals. The ephebes who participated in Artemis’ festivals and those who served as hoplites established connections to local history and the importance of Athenian military strength through this temple. Worshippers channeled their dedicatory activity to celebrate their previous military service and to convince others of the future success of Athenian forces. At least one of Artemis’ property renters was a military officer, which would also contribute to this image of success. Hoplites, thus, most likely dedicated the monetized dekatē from ἀνδ̣ραπόδōν for the state to put to use. The accounts of the Logistai reveal the constant activity of Artemis Agrotera’s worshippers. This temple was listed first on both occasions in which it loaned to the state. Each of Artemis’ loans was also among the largest, between 4 and 5 talents. The dedicatory actions of the hoplites and ephebes constitute a barometer of military success in the field and a desire for the Athenian state to retain its dominance. Dedications of funds most likely continued to appear in the temple even when the state did not elect to draw on them during the three-year period (426/5–423/2). The temple and its worshippers had a desire to be officially (and continually) recognized for their good fortune. In this way, the temples that provided the most in their loans may have had the most to gain from this system. Alongside the dekatē, which was perhaps offered by a larger unit of hoplites, the coinage dedications show individual participation in far-flung Athenian campaigns and individual care for this cult’s well-being. Artemis Agrotera is only one temple of many who participated in these loans, but it holds a unique place in its historical context. Its transactions dramatize and humanize the resiliency of Athenian forces in the opening phase of this war who suffered greatly (and caused great suffering) at sea, at the hands of the plague, in siege works, and on the battlefield. Their actions, in a way, are the reverse of the ephebic procession on 6 Boedromion. They approach Artemis, returning home as seasoned veterans, with dedications they themselves earned on campaign for future generations to celebrate. [141]