6. Kleon and Tribute: Re-Examining the Import of Financial Expertise in Athenian Statesmanship

This piece tackles the “financial expertise” theory that Kleon and politicians like him (subsequent to Perikles) were defined in large part by their appeal to the dēmos on the basis of their ability to manipulate financial systems to the profit of Athens. However, the posited connections between Kleon and such financial measures as the initiation of an eisphora tax and the Kleonymos and Thoudippos decrees are unsupported by the evidence. The only connection between Kleon and the eisphora tax comes from comedy, which lampoons not his creation or imposition of the tax but rather his zeal in applying it. Kleon’s putative relationship with the Kleonymos Decree derives merely from the fact of its dealing with tribute collection and occasional references to Kleonymos and Kleon with a similar tenor in Aristophanes. Although more detailed arguments have been made tying Kleon to the Thoudippos decree, these too turn out to be illusory: the contents of the decree which could be characterized as “harsh” are aimed not at the allies or at opponents of the war with Sparta, but at Athenian corruption (of the very character with which Aristophanes associates Kleon). The timing of the decree does fall shortly after Kleon’s great success at Pylos, but the decree itself stipulates waiting for the return of the army with Nikias, the man usually cast as Kleon’s opponent in the passage of the decree. Finally, F. Bourriot has decisively laid to rest a possible family connection between Kleon and Thoudippos. Indeed, the portrait of Kleon that emerges from a close reading of Aristophanes is not that of a financial wizard, but that of a corrupt warmonger, who may have exploited one or another aspect of public opinion. Allies of Athens faced a twofold challenge in maneuvering around self-interested or venal political actors and in divining and responding to general attitudes about Athenian and allied finances.

In 1962, Antony Andrewes, in an attempt to understand the reality of late-fifth-century [1] Athenian politics lurking behind the powerfully influential opinions of Thucydides, formulated a theory that has come to be known as the theory of “indispensable experts,” or, alternatively, “financial expertise.” Andrewes put it thus:

W. R. Connor [3] incorporated the “financial expertise” theory into his own notion of “new” politicians in post-Periklean Athens who eschewed the traditional political course of friendships, alliances, and office-holding by appealing directly to the dēmos for support. For him, “financial expertise” became a selling-point for these ambitious politicians, born and raised in the world of the arkhē: “The growing need for specialization, I believe, provided the politicians with a new way of appealing for support. They could represent themselves as the masters of the complexities of public affairs. That Cleon did this is perhaps suggested by Aristophanes, Knights 75, and Eupolis frs. 290–292, which perhaps echo Cleon’s oratory.” [4]

One name has recurred in these two formulations of the theory of “financial expertise”: Kleon. This prominence rests on several factors that make him critical to the validity of the entire theory. He is the first politician to hold significant power at Athens after Perikles, [5] and he is the first, and almost certainly the most successful, politician from outside of the established elite in the fifth century, a type specimen of the Attic novus homo. [6] He is also, as we shall see below, often connected by ancient sources to money. If, for all this, he shows no signs of having evinced and traded upon his capacity for expert financial manipulation in service of the polis, all that remains of the “financial expertise” theory is that various Athenian politicians—some early, some late, some of elite background, and some whose fortune was more recent—showed capability with finance and administration, and that some extent of their influence with the dēmos was rooted in the perception and appreciation of that capability. Indeed, far from originating with the expanding arkhē or after the death of Perikles, the recognition that successful management of monetary revenues and expenditures was key to the success of the polis is a through-line in Athenian activity of the fifth century, going back at least to Themistokles and the lucky strike at Laureion in 483.

The question of Kleon’s role in the financial administration of Athens is of long tenure in scholarship. Already in 1924 Allen West could confidently proclaim that “it is no exaggeration to say that Cleon, by common consent, soon took over Pericles’ position as the director of finances of the state.” [7] West essentially makes of Kleon the financier for what he sees as a “radical war party” at Athens, and connects him to the institution of the eisphora, as well as to assessment and collection of tribute. [8] A. W. Gomme responded to West by pointing out that the notion of a “position as the director of finances of the state” “misunderstands the nature of Athenian administration,” and he repeatedly expressed caution about the grounding in the sources for the connections between Kleon and Athenian financial administration. [9] In subsequent scholarship, however, Kleon has been viewed as at least a party to, and often the driving force behind, nearly every financial maneuver made by Athens during the period between Perikles’ death and his own. [10] Thus, it is necessary to consider the evidence for Kleon’s involvement with the three major innovations in financial policy during that period: the already mentioned eisphora, the Kleonymos decree of ca. 426/5, [11] and the Thoudippos decree of 425/4. As part of this effort we shall consider the other evidence for Kleon and finance (much of which survives in the contemporary or nearly contemporary work of Aristophanes) and attempt to paint a coherent picture of how Kleon presented himself as interacting with matters of finance, and how such interactions were perceived by the Athenian dēmos.

Our knowledge about the institution of the eisphora, a property tax, comes from Thucydides 3.19 (summer 428 BCE): “The Athenians, requiring money for the siege [of Mytilene], even though they themselves had paid then for the first time an eisphora of two hundred talents, also sent out to the allies twelve money-levying ships and five generals including Lysikles.” [12] Gomme notes that “Kleon, who may have been a member of the boule in this year, 428–427 …, is generally held to have been responsible for this special tax on the well-to-do,” [13] and Alec Blamire reiterates this judgment. [14] Let us deal first with the question of Kleon as a bouleutēs or hellēnotamias. Leaving aside the association with the eisphora levied in 428/7 to avoid circular argument, the case for Kleon serving on the boulē in 428/7 is so weak that Develin does not even mention it in his survey of Athenian officials from 684 to 321: “Ar. Knights 774 suggests [Kleon] was [bouleutēs ] before 425/4; does Acharn. 379-81 suggest 427/6? There may be some connexion with the eisphora of 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1), but what is suggested in Acharnians could be in the wake of that rather than exactly at that time.” [15] Knights 774 is strong evidence that Kleon served as bouleutēs before its production in 424, but it cannot be used to specify a more exact year, and it suggests not the introduction of an innovative and successful financial maneuver but the kind of frequent and ruthless recourse to the courtroom for which he was otherwise famous:

Aristophanes is mocking Kleon here for constantly harping on his service to the dēmos, so that the concern, frequently discussed in attempts to use Aristophanes to establish chronology, about comedy requiring a recent enough target for it to draw a response from the audience, is not applicable here: Kleon could easily have continued to brag about his “successful” time as a bouleutēs for many years after so serving, and, given the tendency in Athenian oratory to recall offices held and services rendered to the polis, it would almost be more surprising had he not done so. [17] Furthermore, the actions that he undertakes to “fill the public coffers” (σοι χρήματα πλεῖστ’ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ) are brutal acts of enforcement and extortion (στρεβλῶν … ἄγχων … μεταιτῶν); while these actions could be standing in hyperbolically for instituting the eisphora, it is equally if not more probable that they refer to the solicitousness with which he carried out the many responsibilities of review and examination reserved to the boulē. [18]

For West, Kleon’s financial career was indicated and epitomized by his tenure of office as a hellēnotamias: “as Cleon became Hellenotamias in 427, it is very probable that he worked his way up to this position by the attention he gave to imperial affairs.” [19] Georg Busolt, on whom this hellēnotamia depends, [20] uses it to justify dating Kleon’s year in the boulē to 428/7: “He began to take an official interest in matters of state, for he must have sat on the council in 428/7, for other reasons as well as because he was, in all probability, Hellenotamias in the year 427/6.” [21] However, the subsequent redating of the inscription (IG I³ 371) [22] which Busolt had restored for evidence of this hellēnotamia has removed all evidence for it, [23] and with it Busolt’s dating of Kleon as bouleutēs and the pinnacle of West’s vision of Kleon as “director of finance.” Rudi Thomsen, in his monograph on the eisphora, considers Knights 923–926, Wasps 31–41, and Eupolis F 300 K. – A. in addition to Knights 774, and he concludes that:

About the fragment of Eupolis, he concludes that even its attachment to Kleon “is mere guesswork, based on the unproved assumption that he was responsible for the introduction of the eisphora.” [24] Thomsen ultimately finds neither direct nor circumstantial evidence for Kleon’s instituting the eisphora in 428/7 compelling, and concludes that Lysikles [25] or another, unknown figure could just as easily be responsible.

Before we move on from the eisphora, Knights 923–926 and its context are worth briefly considering for their resemblance to Knights 774 and because, as we shall see, they fit the emerging picture of Kleon’s involvement with finance:

The Paphlagonian, Aristophanes’ stand-in for Kleon, is threatening that, to get revenge on his personal opponent, the Sausage-Seller, he will misuse his position (1) to assign him a trierarchy, (2) to ensure that the trireme to which he is assigned is in the worst possible condition, and (3) to enroll him among the rich for the purposes of the eisphora (an action by no means the same as initiating the eisphora). It would be a stretch in the extreme to interpret any of this as financial wizardry on behalf of the state treasury: it is vindictive pettiness on the part of one politician abusing the tools at hand to ruin a competitor for the favor of the dēmos. [27] Kleon is not an expert here, he is simply corrupt. We shall return to the Sausage-Seller’s riposte, which provides important evidence for the nature of Kleon’s involvement with the tribute of the allies. First, however, Kleon’s putative involvement with the Kleonymos and Thoudippos decrees needs to be reviewed and addressed.

The decree of Kleonymos will be considered first, both because it continues our chronological movement through Kleon’s career (eisphora in 428/7, Kleonymos decree probably in 426/5, Thoudippos decree in 425/4) and because there is far less evidence and scholarship tying it to Kleon, much of which is either the same as that for the Thoudippos decree or relies on a narrative including both decrees. There are six central aspects to the Kleonymos decree: [28] (1) each of the allied cities are to choose collectors (eklogeis) of the tribute to ensure its collection, and those collectors are possibly to be liable to scrutiny; [29] (2) lists of cities that have fully paid their tribute, cities that have partially paid, and cities that have defaulted are to be compiled and published; [30] (3) five men are to be sent to each city still owing tribute to collect on the debt; [31] (4) an amendment stipulates hastily bringing the proposal before the people to aid the war effort; [32] (5) the generals are to be involved in dealings with those cities that are in debt; [33] (6) anyone contravening the decree is to be prosecuted, and procedures for this prosecution are included. [34] Kleon shows up nowhere in the decree itself, nor is he explicitly connected to it by any ancient source, so what evidence is marshalled by modern scholarship to support his involvement?

Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, in their commentary on this inscription, note that “Kleonymos is one of Aristophanes’ favourite targets, a coward, a glutton, and liar (for references see PA 8680, i. 580). His politics were probably those of Cleon (see especially Wasps, 592 f.).” [35] In the Athenian Empire, Meiggs reiterates that Kleon “was supported by Cleonymus, Hyperbolus, and probably Thudippus”; [36] in defense of this “party-lite” view of Athenian politics he asserts that “[i]t would be naïve to believe that Cleon had no associates, and that the views he expressed in the Assembly were not shared by associates.” [37] Be this as it may, a similarity of views and even the possibility of mutual support in the ekklēsia are not evidence for Kleon as the driving force behind the Kleonymos decree, nor does the passage from Wasps really support a notable association between Kleonymos and Kleon:

All that we see here is Kleonymos, Euathlos, and Kleon acting as prosecutors and swearing their allegiance to the people of Athens. There is not even any policy connection suggested by Aristophanes between the figures. Note, however, the further connection between Kleon and prosecutorial zeal.

Nevertheless, Ostwald (and Meiggs) both push the connection between Kleon and the Kleonymos decree further: “there are indications that Cleon was behind two decrees that tried to squeeze the last drop of tribute from the allies … That Cleonymus and Thudippus acted as friends and agents of Cleon can be inferred from the severe and impatient tone of their decrees, and especially of Thudippus’s.” [39] Thus, for Ostwald, Kleon and Kleonymos have moved beyond “associates” who had similar beliefs and/or goals with respect to policy; now we have Kleon “behind” the decree(s), and Kleonymos acting as an “agent” of Kleon. In a note presumably supporting the association of Kleon and Kleonymos, Ostwald cites only Meiggs and Lewis 1988:188 and Meiggs 1972:317, both of which we have seen before provide little reason to think of the relationship as one in which Kleon dominated and gave direction. The notion of “tone” is, as Ostwald states, even more prominent in scholarship on the Thoudippos decree, but before we turn to that decree it is worth quoting at length from Meiggs, who provides a perfect example of the “narrative” into which Kleon, Kleonymos, Thoudippos, and the decrees concerning tribute have often been placed:

Meiggs is slightly more cagey about the relationship between Kleon and Kleonymos than is Ostwald, but he clearly connects Kleon with both the Kleonymos decree and the Thoudippos decree. For him, both decrees represent a partisan struggle at Athens in which “new radicals” who support the war with Sparta attempt to extract funds for the war effort from the allies over the opposition of a “moderate” party headed by Nikias. [40] Meiggs infers this partisan clash from “the polemical tone” specifically of the Thoudippos decree. [41] I add this emphasis because, to the best of my knowledge, Ostwald is the only scholar to associate severity of tone with the Kleonymos decree, as opposed to the Thoudippos decree. In this connection it is worth noting that the Kleonymos decree lacks most of the penalties in the Thoudippos decree which have been used to argue for the severity of that decree.

Let us turn, then, to the Thoudippos decree, and let us begin with the “tone” of the inscription before moving to other arguments for connecting it to Kleon. Meiggs gives the fullest statement of the camp who associate the decree with Kleon, and he is echoed by Ostwald and Meiggs-Lewis:

The focus is on penalties [43] and required regular assessments, which are connected to “the violence associated with Cleon and his associates” and “the bullying tone that gives Aristophanes so much scope in the Knights.” Looking back to Meiggs’ earlier narrative of the back-and-forth over war and tribute in the 420s, we can see Kleon as pro-war aligning with a pro-war funding decree. And the Thoudippos decree is certainly clear that it aims to support the army (lines 37–38; cf. Kleonymos decree 27–30) by requiring a swift reassessment (lines 8–12, 18–20, 33–38), which will increase the amount of the tribute (lines 16–22). However, the decree also directs considerable space to reorganizing the system of tribute assessment so as to regularize it and place it more firmly under the control and oversight of the dēmos. The clause insisting on regular, Great Panathenaic assessments (lines 31–33) fits better here than it does in the context of immediate wartime funding concerns, and we see in addition the taktai being required to assess in accordance with tribute adjudications in the hēliaia (lines 13–16), the establishment of a dikasteric court to review assessments along with the boulē (lines 16–18), direct and explicit rules about how tribute is to be assessed and under what circumstances tribute decreases are permissible (lines 19–20), the prytanies being required to introduce the question of assessment to the ekklēsia every Panathenaia, as well as carrying out other requisite actions related to tribute assessment (lines 27–31), and the routes and proclamations of the heralds being strictly controlled (lines 40–44). Loren J. Samons has astutely pointed out that these concerns are a common theme running through Athenian financial decrees in the 420s: “Developments in the bureaucracy of tribute-collection and the hike in tribute assessments of 425/4 obviously presented motives and opportunities for fraud in the system. So much is clear from the decrees of Kleonymos, Thoudippos and Kleinias.” [44] It is easy to associate Kleon with the pro-war position, since Thucydides 4.22 makes clear his opinion of peace in May 425 when Spartan peace overtures were being considered. However, should it be quite so easy a task to determine how much of the public control and oversight about tribute ought to be attributed to him?

To answer this question, let us look at our ancient sources and see exactly what kind of behavior Kleon is associated with when it comes to tribute. Meiggs and Lewis mention the Knights, and so we can start there. At line 78, Paphlagon’s hand is said to be among the Aitolians. [45] Paphlagon’s entrance onstage occurs as he is being beaten, an act which the chorus of knights cheers on: “rightly so, since you gobble public funds before you’re allotted an office; and like a fig picker you squeeze magistrates under review, looking to see which of them is raw, which ripe and unripe; yes, and what’s more, you scan the citizenry for anyone who’s an innocent lamb, rich and innocuous and afraid of litigation.” [46] A little later he is described as “watching the tribute from up above on the rocks like a tunny-fisher.” [47] At 438 the Sausage-Seller accuses Paphlagon of getting ten talents from Poteidaia, and then promises to charge him over a thousand times for theft (κλοπή). [48] In a further confrontation, the Sausage-Seller claims at 802–804 that Paphlagon is stealing and taking bribes from the allies while hoodwinking Demos, [49] and at 823–835 that he “breaks the choicest stalks off the audits of outgoing officials and gulps them down, and with both hands sops the gravy from the people’s treasury … [and] took a bribe from Mytilene of over forty minas!” [50] Then we come back around to the Sausage-Seller’s riposte to Paphlagon’s threats about trierarchies and the eisphora which we mentioned above:

At 992–996 the chorus jokes that as a youth Kleon was expelled from music classes for a propensity for bribe-taking. [52] In the Clouds, the chorus advises the Athenians to “convict that vulture Kleon of bribery and theft, then clamp his neck in the pillory.” [53] Kritias, meanwhile, is reported to have claimed that “Kleon had not even the property of a free man before coming to public affairs, but subsequently left behind an estate worth fifty talents.” [54] A scholiast’s note on Acharnians 6 attributes to Theopompos the information that “Kleon took five talents from the islanders, in order that he might persuade the Athenians to lighten their eisphorai.” [55]

The clear pattern that emerges from these passages is the same as that seen in our consideration of the eisphora. It is not of Kleon as a master financial manipulator concerned with maximizing Athenian revenues, but of Kleon as just another corrupt politician, pledging allegiance to the dēmos and bragging about his accomplishments in office like any other politician while simultaneously lining his own pockets at the expense of Athenian interests. As Lowell Edmunds has observed, “Aristophanes’ principal explicit charge against Cleon [in the Knights ] is that he steals the city’s money.” [56] That Aristophanes saw Kleon not as anything truly unique, but as one of a type that was widespread at Athens is apparent from both the Knights and the Wasps. Thus, Bdelykleon in the Wasps speaks of “the ‘I won’t betray the Athenian rabble and I’ll fight for the masses’ bunch” who “extort fifty talent bribes from the allied cities by terrifying them with threats like this: ‘You’ll hand over the tribute, or I’ll upend your city with my thundering!’ While you [the Athenian dēmos ] are content to gnaw the rinds of your own empire.” [57] The entire plot of the Knights is an exercise in competitive corruption, as the Sausage-Seller overthrows the Paphlagonian by beating him at his own game; Edmunds comments on the “cheerful nihilism” of the chorus of knights in supporting the Sausage-Seller:

When the Sausage-Seller warns Demos to beware of the Paphlagonian who is always requesting revenue-collecting ships, he ends by pledging to pay the soldiers on those ships in a hyperbolic promise comparable to Kleon’s own about Pylos. [58] Finally, Demos vaunts that he selects a thieving prostatēs to fatten up and then swats that leader down, [59] and that he monitors such leaders (plural!), pretending not to see their theft until he extracts the money in court. [60]

Several of the passages we have discussed are particularly meaningful in the context of the Thoudippos decree. The fragment of Theopompos provides one likely example of Kleon taking (or extorting) money from allied cities to lower their tribute, but similar situations also probably lurk behind the references to Kleon accepting bribes from the allies at Knights 78, 438, 802, 834, and 930–933, and this kind of personal enrichment is the best background for the image of Kleon as the fisher lurking in wait for the allied tribute at 313. Our evidence, then, suggests that Kleon was exactly the sort of politician against whom many of the stipulations of the Thoudippos decree were designed to protect. Furthermore, the idea that a career military leader like Nikias would have attempted to undermine the war effort by disrupting necessary funding for the Athenian army is not so obvious as Meiggs makes it out to be. Nikias was strategos six times between 428/7 and 421/0, after all, and would have been acutely aware of the need for augmented funds to secure military success. He displays this awareness twice in the course of the Sicilian expedition when, despite being embroiled in an effort he opposed, he recommends a large, well-funded initial expedition (Thucydides 6.21–23), and requests reinforcements and significantly more financial support after the venture has bogged down (Thucydides 7.13–15). The only real association between Nikias and lower tribute is the backing down from 425/4 levels that occurs after the death of Kleon, [61] but such a change can as easily be explained as a reasonable response to the lower financial demands of peacetime as by a long-standing policy of moderation with respect to allied tribute. [62] Besides, the “backing down” of tribute during the Peace of Nikias was not terribly significant: the assessment of 422/1, made before the Peace, likely decreased the total assessment from its high of 1460+ T in 425/4 to something closer to 1200 T, [63] and there is no indication that the assessment of 418 provided further decreases. [64] We should consider the possibility that the strong language mandating expediency in the Thoudippos decree was a reaction to the urgent necessities of the wartime situation, rather than being reflective of an underlying attempt to undercut the Athenian war effort, and that the attempts at regulation and oversight were actually aimed at ensuring that politicians like Kleon were not becoming rich at the expense of the Athenian military. In evaluating this possibility we must consider two further possible connections between Kleon and the Thoudippos decree: the timing of the decree, and a putative marriage between Thoudippos and the daughter of Kleon.

Much has been made of the close chronological proximity between the Thoudippos decree and the surprising and momentous success of Kleon at Pylos. The precise details of this hypothesis have evolved over time, centering largely on the mention of the returning army at lines 33–35, the appropriate restoration and understanding of the various prytanies named in the decree, and Thucydides’ timeline of Kleon’s Pylos campaign. Initially, H. T. Wade-Gery and Benjamin Meritt argued that the prytany dating the principle decree (line 3, entirely restored) should be the third prytany, and that the one in line 34 (partially restored) should be the second prytany. [65] On the basis of the stipulation that this second prytany was to bring the matter to the dēmos and even stretch the ekklēsia meeting to a second day if necessary to conclude discussion, it was argued that the probouleuma was formulated towards the end of this second prytany. This would be around mid-September, which would match up well with Wade-Gery and Meritt’s interpretation of the narrative of Thucydides as locating the Spartan surrender at Pylos around September fifth. [66] In light of this extremely close timing, Wade-Gery and Meritt proposed a scenario in which:

However, Gomme proposed a different chronology, arguing that “the second week of August seems to be the latest date possible for the finish of the campaign.” [67] Meiggs and Lewis objected to Wade-Gery and Meritt’s reconstruction on this basis, and by noting that, “[i]f this reconstruction is right, a stele was set up on the Acropolis which said that the members of the [Oineis] prytany would be very heavily fined if they did not do what it was already known they had not done (ll. 34–8).” [68] Ultimately, and without convincingly resolving some of the epigraphic points of Wade-Gery and Meritt, Meiggs and Lewis agreed with Malcolm McGregor, who had suggested that the ‘army returning’ in the Thoudippos decree referred to Nikias’ campaign in Corinthia subsequent to Kleon’s return from Pylos. [69] In 1971, based upon further discoveries and developments in his understanding of the calendar of 425/4, Meritt conceded that “the first decree was passed … in the fifth prytany, Leontis (line 3),” [70] and thus that “the decree was passed only after the return of the troops from the Korinthia.” [71]

Ultimately, despite the disagreements about the exact timing of the Thoudippos decree, most scholars have agreed that the decree was made possible by, and indeed indicates, the supremacy of Kleon. Meritt, even after backing off about regarding the decree “as the immediate consequence of that victory,” [72] still thought that it “came so close after Kleon’s spectacular triumph at Pylos that his prestige was high and any elective position that he wished could have been open to him … the assessment of 425 B.C. belonged to Kleon.” [73] Meiggs and Lewis come to a similar conclusion, noting that “the date is still sufficiently near to Cleon’s spectacular triumph to justify the belief that his political followers were primarily responsible for it.” [74] The situation is slightly different for McGregor, who attempts to take more fully into account the timing of the decree during/after Nikias’ campaign in the Corinthia:

Kleon was undoubtedly popular at the time when the Thoudippos decree was passed, but can we assume from that popularity that he (or “his political followers”) were responsible for it? For one thing, we should take care in accepting McGregor’s judgment about Athenian feelings regarding the Corinthian campaign of Nikias. McGregor calls the expedition a “failure” and a “futile attempt” to match Kleon’s achievement, but the narrative in Thucydides does not support such an assertion: the Athenians solidly defeat the Corinthians in battle (Thucydides 4.44.6), withdraw in good order when further forces arrive (4.44.5–6), ravage the territory of the Corinthians (4.45.1), and fortify Methana to be used as a base for future raiding (4.45.2). Although the result was not as spectacular as was Kleon’s success as Pylos, there is no indication that the Athenians were displeased with the results of Nikias’ Corinthian campaign. Nikias was in fact elected as strategos again in 424/3 and 423/2. [76]

Furthermore, popularity with the Athenian people in no way guaranteed that a politician would have his way on any particular matter. After being introduced to the Histories in 3.36 as “by far the most influential with the dēmos at the time,” Kleon is immediately overruled on the question of how to deal with the rebellious Mytilenians. [77] The entire concept of the ostracism revolved around expelling a leader at or near the height of their popularity. Perhaps most importantly, however, the timing of the decree may actually argue against a narrative in which Kleon as leader of those supporting the war effort jammed through the Thouddipos decree at a moment of strength for himself and weakness for Nikias, his opponent and leader of a “moderate” party. If the scholarly consensus is correct about the timing of the decree’s passage, then the prytaneis of Oeneis are required to hold off on introducing the decree to the ekklēsia until after Nikias has returned with his troops. If Kleon was in Athens (and we have no reason to think that he was not), and the Thoudippos decree was a piece of legislation that Nikias had prevented him from passing, why would he wait until Nikias returned to Athens to bring the probouleuma before the dēmos ? Such a stipulation makes far more sense if Nikias was expected to support its passage. [78]

There is one final piece of circumstantial evidence frequently adduced to support Kleon’s involvement with the Thoudippos decree: a prosopographical connection between the politician and the proposer of the decree. In a footnote to the article of Wade-Gery and Meritt that we have been discussing, the authors suggest that the Thoudippos of IG I³ 71 should be identified with a Thoudippos mentioned in Isaios 9 (“On the Estate of Astyphilos”) as the father of a man named Kleon:

Meiggs and Lewis called the suggestion “attractive,” [79] and Davies expanded upon it in his entry on Θούδιππος (Ι) Ἀραφήνιος in Athenian Propertied Families: “The first suggestion [that Thoudippos (I) should be identified with the proposer of the reassessment decree of 425/4] is as good as certain; the second [i.e. that he should be regarded, because of the name of his son, as the son-in-law of Kleon (I) of Kydathenaion] fits as well chronologically as it does politically, and is very probably correct as well.” [80] However, this association has been strongly challenged by F. Bourriot in his 1982 article on “La famille et le milieu social de Cléon.”

Bourriot attacks the proposed marriage connection on nearly every front. He begins by providing an important caution against reconciling simple homonymies, using as an example the Astyphilos of Araphen from Isaios 9, a rare name and a man who, by chronology, one might be tempted without further information to associate with an Astyphilos proposing a decree admitting Methymna to the Second Athenian Confederacy. [81] In the case of Astyphilos we have the necessary information to rule out such an identification, but the warning is well worth keeping in mind for the case of Thoudippos. Bourriot then examines Isaios 9 for support for the identification of Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of IG I³ 71, concluding that there was none to be detected. [82] The political connection is also questionable. As Bourriot notes, the two are from different worlds: Kleon a nouveau-riche politician from the city deme of Kydathenaion, and Thoudippos from “a family of the sort which evokes more the rural milieu of Aristophanes.” [83] This rural background also means that “one can only with difficulty imagine Thoudippos, a peasant of the eastern coast, coming to the ekklēsia to propose a capital law on the tribute of the allies which requires knowledge far exceeding the horizon of Araphen.” [84] (It is worth noting here that Nikias seems to have aligned far better with the “milieu of Aristophanes” than did Kleon, given the notable restraint shown towards the former in his plays.) Ultimately, then, all that supports the identification of Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of IG I³ 71 is two pieces of homonymy stacked atop each other: Thoudippos and Kleon. Furthermore, even if we lean towards identifying Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of IG I³ 71 on the basis of the rarity of the name Thoudippos, the same argument cannot be made for Kleon: as J. S. Traill points out, “the name is known in at least 25 other demes and has about 75 Attic occurrences.” [85] Traill also endorses Bourriot’s conclusions about Thoudippos. [86]

We have seen that arguments for attributing the Thoudippos decree of 425/4 to the impetus of Kleon on the basis of tone, timing, and prosopography are all unconvincing. Our study of the evidence for Kleon’s interactions with tribute have revealed not a man with a financial bent who was dead set on squeezing the allies to provide more money for the war effort with Sparta, but a politician with a reputation for making money at the expense of the city coffers, precisely the kind of behavior that decrees like the Thoudippos decree and (if we accept Samons and Fornara’s redating [87] ) the Kleinias decree were designed to prevent. The timing of the Thoudippos decree and the stipulation therein that the prytaneis wait for Nikias’ return from campaign before presenting it to the dēmos is also poorly suited to the argument for a Kleonian initiative. Finally, as we have just seen, the putative family connection between Kleon and Thoudippos is extremely weak, especially without the added support of a previously assumed association between Kleon and the decree that Thoudippos proposed. Thus, it is necessary to agree with Gomme, against the general trend in scholarship, that “the common assumption … that Kleon was specially responsible for [the Thoudippos decree], is wrong.” [88] Such a conclusion may draw some support from Aristophanes’ complete silence about any connection between Kleon and the decree, a silence that made Meiggs nervous:

Our new appreciation for the Thoudippos decree resolves this difficulty in two ways. First, if Kleon was not associated with the decree, there is no particular reason for Aristophanes to incorporate the decree among his attacks on Kleon in the Knights. Second, if the decree was designed to primarily accomplish two goals—(1) to provide funding to continue the war effort and (2) to cut down on the corruption among politicians with respect to the tribute system—Aristophanes may well have been conflicted about how to react to it. He expresses strong yearnings for peace in many plays of the 420s, but he spends even more time attacking politicians for their corruption, and so he may have decided to take a wait-and-see approach on whether to decry or vaunt about the decree. [90]

Thus, what evidence we have for how Kleon was viewed by his contemporaries does not suggest a man who gained the support of the dēmos by possessing, and trading on, “financial expertise” or mastery of the mass of details of imperial administration that was beyond the reach of the common man. [91] Instead it suggests a forceful, opinionated man willing to take drastic steps to get what he wants, who gained the support of the Athenian dēmos by operating with the aggressiveness and polypragmasunē that characterized the Athenian ethos. [92] This is the same image of Kleon that has been discovered by close analyses of his speeches in the Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides, such as those of James Andrews, who notes Kleon’s appeals to a very traditional concept of arēte to persuade the Athenians to adopt his position. [93] As I suggested at the outset, this conclusion essentially strikes a killing blow to the “financial/indispensable experts” theory: if Perikles is perhaps the best example of a politician who was versed in financial minutiae and, on the basis of at least two passages in Thucydides, 2.13 and 2.65, used that financial knowledge as part of his appeal to the dēmos for support, [94] while Kleon shows no signs of similar capability or reputation with financial matters, surely it is perverse to suggest that only upon the former’s death and the latter’s ascension did financial expertise begin to serve as a critical aspect of a political career at Athens.