Spartan Nauarchs of the 390s: Xenophon, Diodorus, and the Naval War

Our knowledge about the Spartan nauarchs of the mid-390s [1] is derived exclusively from literary sources: Xenophon, Diodorus and the anonymous author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. Since the accounts of these three historians are not fully compatible with one another, discussion of what seems to be a historical issue—the history of Spartan nauarchy between 399 and 394—turns out to give rise to a series of philological questions: How are conflicting testimonies by Greek historians to be dealt with; how are we to assess the reliability of literary sources; and, ultimately, how should we read Greek historical narratives? The first part of this paper surveys the historical information which the texts provide; the second part aims at the interpretation of some key historiographical passages in their respective contexts.

The Spartan nauarchy is not well documented. It is generally known that a person could hold this office only once, [2] and that the naval year began around the end of summer or in the early autumn; the new nauarch was nominated by the magistrates during the summer, but we possess no details about the actual election procedure. Only a few names of fifth-century Spartan nauarchs have been preserved, most of these pertaining to the last fifteen years of the century. Sparta was a land power and expanded its navy during the Peloponnesian War; the fleet took on great important in the Ionian War. Sparta’s decisive victory in the naval battle of Aegospotami (405) was a triumph of Lysander who had been nauarch in 408/407, an epistoleus (vice-admiral) in 406/405 (and perhaps also in 405/404), and remained the mastermind behind Spartan foreign and defence policy during the first period of the Spartan hegemony. The nauarchs continued to play a crucial role even after Lysander’s decline in the years following the restoration of democracy in Athens (403), as Sparta tried to establish its influence not only in mainland Greece but also in Ionia and the West. A naval defeat, in the battle of Cnidus in August 394, played a decisive in the decline of Spartan hegemony. [3]

Before the London papyrus of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia was published (1908), the only established names of Spartan nauarchs between 399 and the battle of Cnidus (394) were Pharax and Peisandros. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia added three further names to the list, those of Archelaidas, Pollis, and Cheiricrates. While this was a welcome addition to our knowledge, the testimony of the anonymous historian raised further problems. Firstly, Pollis (who according to the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia became nauarch in 395) was mentioned by Xenophon as the nauarch of 377/376, [4] a state of affairs which would have violated the rule prohibiting the same person from holding the office twice. Secondly, the replacement of Archelaidas by Pollis happened in spring 395 rather than at the customary time of year (i.e. the end of the summer). Did Pollis serve more or less than a year? Was he an ordinary nauarch or was he charged with a nauarch’s duties without being officially nominated, because the official nauarch Archelaidas had for some reason become unable to fulfil the role? Thirdly, while the new text tells us that the nauarch of 395/394 was Cheiricrates, Xenophon (Hellenica 3.4.27–29) mentions another nauarch in relation to this period, namely Peisandros. Our aim here is to make some suggestions as to how all of these inconsistencies might be resolved.

Pharax is mentioned by Xenophon in Hellenica 3.2.12–14 as a nauarch who was active in the Aegean in the first half of the 390s. Diodorus reports that he initiated a blockade of the Persian fleet under Conon in Caunus; he further mentions that the blockade was lifted by Pharax himself several months later (14.79.4–7). Pharax is referred to in Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 10.1 as the nauarch of a (the?) previous year (ὁ πρότερον ναύαρχος) in a passage which deals with the so-called Demaenetos affair, in which the latter took a trireme and sailed from Athens to join Conon, an incident which is known from this text alone and whose date does not appear in the preserved fragments of the work. The event is now safely dated to the end of 396 or, rather, to the first months of 395, [5] which means that, Pharax must have been the nauarch of 397/396 or earlier. We know of no other nauarch for the years 399/398 and 398/397, yet these dates would be too early for the activities reported by Xenophon and Diodorus. [6] We may thus conclude that Pharax was nauarch in 397/396. [7] Consequently, the blockade of Conon’s fleet by Pharax in Caunus must be dated to 396. [8] Its duration is unknown.

A further question regarding Pharax is whether he is the same person as a certain Φαρακίδας who, according to Diodorus (14.63.4, 14.70.1, 14.70.3, 14.72.1), was sent in 396/395 as commander of a Spartan naval force to support Dionysius of Syracuse against the Carthaginians. [9] Most scholars accept the identification of the two. [10] The different form of the name may be due to Diodorus’ use of a different source. [11] The number of individuals named Pharax is also a matter of debate. Pausanias 4.3.15 reports that after Aigospotami the Ephesians dedicated statues of Pharax, Lysander, Eteonicos, and other Spartans to the temple of Artemis, a sign that Pharax (the nauarch) took an active part in the final stages of the Ionian War. He is probably the same Pharax who became proxenos of Thebes, [12] and was sent as an ambassador to Athens in 370. [13] The name is also associated with one of the ten σύμβουλοι who accompanied King Agis in Mantineia in 418. However, this person must have been old enough to be the King’s σύμβουλος in the early 410s (cf. Diodorus 12.79.6: ἀξίωμα … μέγιστον ἔχων ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ); he can hardly have remained active in public life for some fifty years after that; [14] this second Pharax may also have been the father of a certain Styphon (called son of Pharax), who served as a commander in Pylos in 425 (Thucydides 4.38.1). Another Spartan of the same name was active in Sicily in 355; he was reputedly of bad character. [15]

The name Archelaidas is found only in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 12.2 (εἰς τὴν ναυαρχίαν τὴ]ν ᾽Αρχελαΐδα κατα[στὰς διάδοχος). The text is corrupt and there is no general agreement that this is the name of a nauarch, as is assumed by most editors and commentators, who accept the restoration of the passage by Newman. [16] An intriguing question is why the nauarch of 396/395 was replaced in spring 395, but the reason for the replacement is not attested in any source.

The name of Archelaidas’ successor has not been preserved in this passage, but it can only be Pollis, since in 22.1 the Oxyrhynchus historian reports that in late summer 395 Pollis was succeeded in the nauarchy by Cheiricrates. It follows that he served for less than a year in this office, more specifically a full summer season (which includes the spring). Pollis remained active for several years. He is mentioned as a vice-admiral (epistoleus) at the side of nauarch Podanemos in 393/392 (Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.11); in 388 he was sent as an envoy to Syracuse. [17] In addition, as already noted, he is mentioned as the nauarch of 377/6 who was defeated by Chabrias at Naxos.

Cheiricrates is not known from any other source. According to the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, in autumn 395 he replaced Pollis as commander of a fleet consisting of vessels from Sparta and the Ionian cities. He is mentioned again en passant in 25.4 (in autumn 395 he sent a certain Pangalos to the Hellespont with five triremes; Pangalos collaborated with Agesilaus who spent the following winter in Phrygia). Xenophon not only ignores Cheiricrates, but actually mentions another nauarch in relation to the same period. The Athenian author states that in the summer of 395, following Agesilaus’ victory in Sardeis, the king was asked by the Spartan authorities to appoint a nauarch himself (an astonishing piece of information) and accordingly chose Peisandros. [18] He later reports Peisandros’ death in Cnidus (see 3.4.27–29). It is inconceivable that the terms of office of two nauarchs could have overlapped; was Cheiricrates relieved of his duties, [19] or does one of the two historians err? Xenophon’s text will be discussed in the second part of this paper. First, however, let us examine Diodorus’ passage on the earlier events of the naval war.

Diodorus provides the most complete record of the beginning of the naval war. Here is his text:

The above record is valuable, because Xenophon omits these incidents completely. However, the chronology and relative order of events between Conon’s appointment as commander of the Persian fleet (397) and the democratic revolution in Rhodes (summer 395) is not entirely clear. Diodorus’ account evidently includes events from more than one year. In chapters 14.40–78 he had related the events of four consecutive years in the West (see 14.44.1, 47.1 and 54.1), after which (14.79.1–3) he returned to the East to report Agesilaus’ campaign; this section covers a year’s activity up to autumn 396. When he finally turns to the naval war, he has to return to earlier developments. [21] In addition, the activities he attributes to Pharax extend beyond the end of the latter’s nauarchy and move to Sicily (late summer/early autumn 396). With this in mind, Meyer (1909:71), suggested that Diodorus was mistaken in attributing the blockade to Pharax. [22] It is, however, possible that the blockade began under Pharax in summer 396, meaning that the first mention of him by Diodorus is justified, but that Diodorus then omitted to report the change of nauarch. [23] The reason for this confusion may have been Diodorus’ practice of grouping actions by different agents into distinct, consecutive sections: as in the macro-structure of his work, Diodorus gives priority to a thematic arrangement also on a micro-level, i.e. within a single narrative, when he summarizes a more detailed source; this leads to a division of information according to individual actors. Thus, in the first section, he brings together the activities of the Spartans, starting with the mission to the Egyptian king and then focusing on Pharax. He gives a complete account of his actions (overlooking, however, the fact that, the nauarch had changed in the meantime partly because of the suppression of chronology) and only after having mentioned the termination of the blockade, does he move on to events in the opposite camp (Conon and the Rhodians, who had already changed sides). At the end, he concentrates on the actions of others: the arrival of the Egyptian help (which was captured by the Rhodians) and of the Phoenician fleet.

Taking into account the limits of Diodorus’ reliability, a consequence of his method of summarizing longer narratives, we can tentatively reconstruct the events in a way which is fully compatible with the other available sources. Conon was appointed commander of the Persian fleet in 397. After preparing his squadron, he moved to Cilicia, at the end of the same year. [24] In spring or early summer 396 [25] Conon sailed with forty triremes from Cilicia to Caunus. Pharax, who was still in office, initiated the blockade. After some months, the appearance of a large Persian force under Tissaphernes and Artaphernes alarmed the Spartans, and the new nauarch, who had replaced Pharax in late summer/early autumn 396 (and whose name we know to have been Archelaidas thanks to the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia), lifted the blockade. This provided Conon with the opportunity to move his fleet from Caunus to the Rhodian Chersonesos on the Asian coast. [26] At the same time, the increased Persian military presence in the area made it clear to the oligarchic government of Rhodes that their alliance with Sparta might prove a source of trouble for the city. They therefore expelled all Spartan officials from the island and closed their harbour to the Lacedaemonian fleet. That violent acts were perpetrated against Spartans is strongly suggested by their own harsh treatment of the Rhodian Dorieus: they arrested their former ally in Greece and executed him. [27] Diodorus’ statement Ῥόδιοι δ’ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων στόλον ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων must not be taken literally, i.e. as meaning that the fleet was physically driven out. The revolt may have broken out while the fleet was absent, [28] so that the Spartans did not to return to Rhodes, as Diodorus suggested, but perhaps to Sasanda, [29] where they had been based during the blockade.

These events include the reason for Archelaidas’ early replacement. It appears that he was believed to be responsible for the failure of the blockade and the loss of Rhodes to the opposing alliance. As a consequence, he was deposed. Such a reaction is not atypical of Sparta; commanders who withdrew from an operation were regularly regarded as being ineffectual, or suspected of treachery. [30] In such a case, the new nauarch, Pollis must have been officially nominated. Consequently, even if his term of office lasted less than a year, he would not have been permitted to be re-elected as nauarch (due to the rule mentioned above), and this brings us to the next problem, his function in 377/376 Xenophon’s text runs as follows:

The expression Πόλλις δ᾽ αὐτῶν ναύαρχος ἐγένετο does not necessarily entail that Pollis was a nauarch; it rather points to the opposite, since αὐτῶν and ἐγένετο suggest an ad hoc nomination. Thus, the expression merely identifies Pollis as the commander of a specific naval force, the sixty triremes sent to the Corinthian Gulf against the Athenians. Ναύαρχος is not used as a technical term but has a broader significance. This terminological inaccuracy perhaps conflicts with modern expectations of historiography, but it is compatible with ancient writing conventions and, especially, with Xenophon’s habits.

Let us now turn to another Xenophontic section, where the historian claims the same title of nauarch for Peisandros.

Peisandros’ designation as a nauarch is reiterated in 4.3.10 (the announcement of the defeat at Cnidus and of Peisandros’ death to Agesilaus) and is also echoed in Diodorus’ account of the battle. While Diodorus’ confused narrative does not add anything to the discussion, Xenophon’s account is remarkable. Following his recall from Asia Minor, Agesilaus had just arrived at the border of Boeotia, where he received the news about Cnidus.

Let us start from the end. From Xenophon’s brief reference to the battle, it is clear that his intention was to exculpate Peisandros for the defeat: his fleet was numerically inferior in number and his allies had deserted him, nevertheless he displayed bravery and went down fighting. The same holds, naturally, for the account of his appointment. Xenophon emphasizes his qualities as a man, although he admits that he was inexperienced as a naval commander. As he had been selected by Agesilaus, a personal friend whom Xenophon constantly defended. the story that Agesilaus was summoned by the Spartans to appoint a commander seems to clear the king of responsibility for this initiative, in as much as this is possible: He was obliged to nominate the commander and—under the circumstances—his brother-in-law was a good choice. Once more, Xenophon uses ναύαρχος in its non-technical sense. The informed reader is expected to understand this, since the procedure described in the narrative would go against Spartan legislation and practice (if the term were to be interpreted in its narrower sense). In reality, the passage on Peisandros’ appointment makes clear that his task was first to supervise the building of ships in the allied cities of Asia Minor (this must have been the instruction from Sparta), then to assume command of this unit of the fleet.

Xenophon’s text contains a further important hint at the rationale behind the awkward arrangement: its goal was to assure optimal co-operation between the navy and the land forces. It follows that after Agesilaus’ departure for Greece, the navy would have avoided any military engagement. It also explains why the (real) nauarch Cheiricrates was not present. The Lacedaemonians did not envisage a naval battle in the East; the fleet intended to return to Greece, where it was needed in the Corinthian War, and Peisandros, who was the commander of the allied force, was responsible for guiding them to Greece.

Xenophon seems to be writing for contemporaries who knew the facts and would be capable of evaluating his own view of them. For him, defending Agesilaus was a personal priority, not least because he had associated his own career with the Spartan king. At the same time, his treatment of Spartan nauarchs reflects his own views about the office. Read between the lines, we are invited to uncover a message from the experienced Athenian cavalryman. In general, he is quite reticent about naval enterprises, and in 377/376 he allows Jason of Pherae, one of his heroes, to express doubt about a policy aiming at naval supremacy, [34] a traditional target of Athenian politics. Scholars usually regard Xenophon’s omissions regarding the naval war of the 390s as a weakness of Xenophon the historian, but I prefer to treat them as an indirect statement by Xenophon the military theorist. In the case of Spartan nauarchy, we are lucky enough to have, in addition to silences, Xenophon’s unorthodox statements. In my opinion, these cohere and reveal the author’s views about the Spartan military system.

Xenophon had a good knowledge of Spartan affairs. His inaccuracy cannot but be deliberate. By using the technical term more freely, he ostensibly diminishes the importance of technical discourse on the matter, and, as a result, of the matter itself: he suggests that in a way there is something wrong about the nauarchy. In the case of Pollis, he was certainly aware of his term of office (as a nauarch) in 395. And, of course, he had not forgotten what he had already attested, that nauarchs could be elected to the office only once. By calling Pollis a nauarch, while he was not (5.4.61), he indirectly casts doubt on the efficiency of the prohibition on re-election. Understanding that he was only an ad hoc nauarch (ναύαρχον αὐτῶν) readers are indirectly prompted to retrieve their knowledge about the office and wonder whether experienced leaders like Pollis, who were needed and trusted by the Spartans, should be excluded from further service as admirals. The passage about Peisandros addresses another sensitive topic, namely the independence of the nauarch and the lack of communication between the army and the navy, sometimes a source of antagonism between kings and nauarchs. [35] Xenophon takes sides; he argues indirectly that this system is problematic.

To sum up, in the first part of this paper, the list of Spartan nauarchs of the mid-390s was established as follows: 397/396 Pharax; 396/395 Archelaidas (deposed), Pollis; 395/394 Cheiricrates; 394/393 (unknown); 393/392 Podanemos. Peisandros did not hold the office of nauarch. In the second part, we explained inconsistencies in Diodorus’ and Xenophon’s accounts via a discussion of Diodorus’ method and Xenophon’s aims. To abbreviate a longer narrative from his sources, Diodorus rearranges the material by separately grouping together actions by one individual or collective agent. This confuses the order of events, but reduces the complexity of the narrative and makes it more concise; it also better supports the characterization of individuals (at this point Diodorus adheres to the principles of biographic writing). Xenophon’s omissions and inconsistencies can be explained in terms of the nature of his work. The Hellenica is not scientific historiography; it is a literary piece of historical narrative, functioning as a comment on the events of the historian’s times and as a didactic (and self-defensive) personal statement addressed to his contemporaries, in particular the younger ones. Viewed thus, the assertion that the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is of superior value as a historical source than Xenophon’s Hellenica does not look like a petitio principii, as Xenophon’s apologists sometimes complain, but rather, a reality.